2018
DOI: 10.1177/0018720818769249
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Information-Pooling Bias in Collaborative Security Incident Correlation Analysis

Abstract: Potential applications of this research include development of team training procedures and collaboration tool development for security analysts.

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Cited by 13 publications
(16 citation statements)
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References 23 publications
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“…Similar to the limitations of the NICCS framework, these degree granting institutions tend to emphasize technical and electrical engineering skills ( Gates et al, 2014 ) while ignoring the important social and organizational influences that dictate success or failure in everyday settings ( Barrick et al, 2003 ; Meyer et al, 2010 ). Furthermore, developing the knowledge, skills, and abilities that are needed across teams would arguably provide greater fidelity on the make-up and variety of teams needed to build an effective cybersecurity workforce ( Rajivan et al, 2013b ; Rajivan, 2014 ). However, attempting to develop these key baselines without first defining the correct organizational environment will likely only result in a limited ability to produce an effective cyber workforce ( Cable and Parsons, 2001 ; Seong et al, 2015 ; Frank et al, 2016 ).…”
Section: Defining the Cyber Domainmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Similar to the limitations of the NICCS framework, these degree granting institutions tend to emphasize technical and electrical engineering skills ( Gates et al, 2014 ) while ignoring the important social and organizational influences that dictate success or failure in everyday settings ( Barrick et al, 2003 ; Meyer et al, 2010 ). Furthermore, developing the knowledge, skills, and abilities that are needed across teams would arguably provide greater fidelity on the make-up and variety of teams needed to build an effective cybersecurity workforce ( Rajivan et al, 2013b ; Rajivan, 2014 ). However, attempting to develop these key baselines without first defining the correct organizational environment will likely only result in a limited ability to produce an effective cyber workforce ( Cable and Parsons, 2001 ; Seong et al, 2015 ; Frank et al, 2016 ).…”
Section: Defining the Cyber Domainmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, in the private sector it is much more likely for smaller teams to be composed of similarly talented individuals rather than a group with diverse work roles and backgrounds ( Champion et al, 2012 ). Recent research has identified that cybersecurity teams are better able to solve complex tasks than individual analysts, potentially due to the distribution of expertise across analysts ( Rajivan et al, 2013a , b ; Rajivan, 2014 ; Rajivan and Cooke, 2018 ). For instance, performance on incident triage was highest with a diverse group of heterogeneous talents as opposed to a team with members of similar background and skills ( Rajivan et al, 2013b ).…”
Section: Characteristics Of Successful Cyber Professionals and Teamsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To address such challenges, analysts as a team, must be innovative, agile, and adaptable (Terreberry, 1968 ). Evidence from a handful of lab-based, empirical studies (Rajivan et al, 2013 ; Rajivan, 2014 ; Buchler et al, 2016b ) highlight effective collaboration and leadership as critical determinants of performance for cyber defense given the complex and dynamic nature of the task domain. Managing the cognitive work of cybersecurity requires considerable interaction among teams of cyber analysts to monitor, report, and safeguard critical information technology.…”
Section: Cyber Defense Teamingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Occasionally, good data is provided [Champion et al 2012]. And recently, Rajivan and Cooke [2018] showed that operators with unique information often do not share it with the team, which suggests a team SA deficit.…”
Section: Gaps In Sa For Cybersecuritymentioning
confidence: 99%