Information, Market Incentives, and Student Performance

Camargo, Braz; Camelo, Rafael; Firpo, Sérgio; Ponczek, Vladimir

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2396436

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 17 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In a similar study, Camargo, Camelo, Firpo, and Ponczek looked at how divulging test score information on Brazil's national secondary educational exam impacted school performance and composition. They found that test scores improved in private schools, likely because of market pressures (Camargo et al, 2014).…”

Section: On Parental Preferences and School Choice Interventionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Report Cards: Parental Preferences, Information and School Choice in Haiti

Borger¹,

Elacqua²,

Jacas³

et al. 2023

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper studies school choice and information in the context of education markets in rural Haiti. Using a market level randomized control trial, we evaluate the aggregate effect of providing test score information on subsequent test scores, prices, and enrollment. After the intervention, we find that private schools have higher test scores, with an average increase of 0.3 standard deviations in treated markets. However, we are unable to detect significant changes to prices and market shares. These findings suggest that providing information in poor education markets can improve market efficiency and benefit children's welfare.

show abstract

Section: On Parental Preferences and School Choice Interventionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Report Cards: Parental Preferences, Information and School Choice in Haiti

Borger¹,

Elacqua²,

Jacas³

et al. 2023

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Multiple Testing and the Distributional Effects of Accountability Incentives in Education

Lehrer

Pohl

Song

2021

Journal of Business & Economic Statistics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Economic theory that underlies many empirical microeconomic applications predicts that treatment responses depend on individuals' characteristics and location on the outcome distribution. Using data from a large-scale Pakistani school report card experiment, we consider tests for treatment effect heterogeneity that make corrections for multiple testing to avoid an overestimation of positive treatment effects. These tests uncover evidence of policy-relevant heterogeneous effects from information provision on child test scores. Further, our analysis reinforces the importance of preventing the inflation of false positive conclusions since over 65% of statistically significant quantile treatment effects become insignificant once corrections for multiple testing are applied.

show abstract

Information, Knowledge and Behavior: Evaluating Alternative Methods of Delivering School Information to Parents

Cerdan-Infantes¹,

Filmer²

2015

Policy Research Working Papers

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

show abstract

Information, Market Incentives, and Student Performance

Cited by 4 publications

References 17 publications

Report Cards: Parental Preferences, Information and School Choice in Haiti

Report Cards: Parental Preferences, Information and School Choice in Haiti

Multiple Testing and the Distributional Effects of Accountability Incentives in Education

Information, Knowledge and Behavior: Evaluating Alternative Methods of Delivering School Information to Parents

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About