Information Manipulation Theory 2

Abstract

Information Manipulation Theory 2 (IMT2) is a propositional theory of deceptive discourse production that conceptually frames deception as involving the covert manipulation of information along multiple dimensions and as a contextual problem-solving activity driven by the desire for quick, efficient, and viable communicative solutions. IMT2 is rooted in linguistics, cognitive neuroscience, speech production, and artificial intelligence. Synthesizing these literatures, IMT2 posits a central premise with regard to deceptive discourse production and 11 empirically testable (that is, falsifiable) propositions deriving from this premise. These propositions are grouped into three propositional sets: intentional states (IS), cognitive load (CL), and information manipulation (IM). The IS propositions pertain to the nature and temporal placement of deceptive volition, in relation to speech production. The CL propositions clarify the interrelationship between load, discourse, and context. The IM propositions identify the specific conditions under which various forms of information manipulation will (and will not) occur.

Lying takes time: A meta-analysis on reaction time measures of deception.

“…Moreover, not a single study in our main meta-analysis revealed a significant reversed RT lie effect (i.e., significantly longer RT for truth telling compared to lying, with the 95% CI not including zero, see Table 1) 8 . This pattern of results is interesting in light of the current debate about whether lying is always more effortful than truth telling or whether -and if so under which circumstances -truth telling may be more effortful than lying (Levine, 2014;McCornack et al, 2014;Verschuere & Shalvi, 2014). Our findings revealed a surprising stability of the cognitive cost of deception, even in some of the situations that have been proposed to modulate or reverse this cost (e.g., practiced deception, relevant information, and motivated liars; De Paulo et al, 2003;McCornack et al, 2014;Walczyk et al, 2014).…”

“…Finally, liars have to monitor their own behavior and that of their interaction partners in order to control behaviors that may be interpreted as lying. In sum, the cognitive view holds that deception is typically more cognitively demanding than truth telling (Ellwanger, Rosenfeld, Sweet, & Bhatt, 1996;Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2004;Spence et al, 2004;Vrij, 2008;Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981; for an opposing view see e.g., McCornack, Morrison, Paik, Wisner, & Zhu, 2014; for boundary conditions see e.g., Walczyk, Harris, Duck, & Mulay, 2014).…”

“…So far, there are a few comprehensive cognitive theories of deception (e.g., Gombos, 2006;McCornack et al, 2014;Spence et al, 2004;Sporer & Schwandt, 2007;Sporer , 2016;Walczyk et al, 2014). The most elaborate theory is the Activation-Decision-ConstructionAction Theory (ADCAT) of deception (Walczyk et al, 2014).…”

“…Furthermore, Walczyk et al (2014) proposed that lying becomes more difficult the more entrenched the truthful response is in the liar, whereas it becomes easier the more the deceptive response has been rehearsed and practiced (see also De Paulo et al, 2003). It is theorized that there may in fact be situations in which truth telling turns out to be cognitively more demanding than lying (McCornack et al, 2014;Walczyk et al, 2014). Identifying those situations is crucial in order to gain information about the validity and the boundaries of cognition-based methods of deception detection.…”

Measuring the cognitive resources consumed per second for real-time lie-production and recollection: a dual-tasking paradigm

“…In fact, some researchers believe that lying is prevalent in everyday life because lying is less cognitively effortful than truth-telling in many situations (McCornack et al, 2014). …”