Information Leaks and Voluntary Disclosure

Ebert, Michael; Schäfer, Ulrich; Schneider, Georg

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3372141

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 31 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Based on Warner (2012), there are three categories of threats towards cybersecurity namely human vulnerabilities, hardware vulnerabilities and software vulnerabilities. The protection of data has become more important than previous years and resulted in companies increasing their security over data from outside threats including internal threats (Ebert et al, 2019). Companies spending on cybersecurity measures also increase from time to time because of the increased cyber threats.…”

Section: Literature Review Digitalisation and Cybersecuritymentioning

confidence: 99%

Content Analysis of Voluntary Disclosures on Cybersecurity in Malaysia

Ibrahim¹,

Shamsudin²,

Abdullah³

et al. 2021

IJARAFMS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Digitalisation is an important driver of the digital economy. The COVID-19 pandemic further accelerates the adoption of digital technology. Having huge data of clients, suppliers, investors, collaborators, and other business contacts expose companies to cyber threats and attacks. Several regulators such as the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US requires public listed companies to disclose information related to cybersecurity risks. This study aims to explore how Malaysian listed companies reveal information related to cybersecurity in their annual reports. In addition, it also attempts to determine the themes or nature of these disclosures and to assess the disclosure levels. Using a content analysis, this study examined forty-nine annual reports from four sectors. It discovers that most companies disclose information related to cybersecurity under eight (8) common sections: governance and leadership, risk management and internal control, key risks and opportunities, management report, sustainability statement, organisational capital, external environment, and performance review. Furthermore, it suggests that these voluntary disclosures are mostly related to eight (8) themes: Data Protection Act, Data Security and Data Integrity, Cyber Threats and Risks, Cybersecurity Assessment, Focus and Priority, Optimisation, Enhanced and Investment, Policies and Artificial Intelligence. Even though most of these disclosures are at the basic level, there are a few companies with comprehensive disclosure on cybersecurity. The research findings provide valuable insights into voluntary disclosures related to cybersecurity among Malaysian listed companies.

show abstract

Section: Literature Review Digitalisation and Cybersecuritymentioning

confidence: 99%

Content Analysis of Voluntary Disclosures on Cybersecurity in Malaysia

Ibrahim¹,

Shamsudin²,

Abdullah³

et al. 2021

IJARAFMS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…He does not discuss liquidity. Ebert et al (2019) analyze, in a similar framework to ours, dierent types of information leaks. See also Quigley and Walther (2018) and Banerjee and Kim (2017) for related, yet dierent, models of voluntary disclosure where the market may observe additional information.…”

Section: Related Theoretical Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The effect of exogenous information on voluntary disclosure and market quality

Frenkel

Guttman

Kremer

2020

Journal of Financial Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Board bias, information, and investment efficiency

Gregor,

Michaeli

2024

Rev Account Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We identify a novel force behind the benefit of misaligned preferences in corporate governance. Our model entails a CEO who encounters a project and, after gathering information, decides whether to seek the approval of a corporate board. The CEO may be able to choose the properties of the collected information—this may happen if the project is “novel,” i.e., explores a new technology, business concept, or market and directors are less knowledgeable about it. We find that only sufficiently conservative and expansion-cautious directors can discipline the CEO’s empire-building tendency and opportunistic information collection. Such directors, however, underinvest in projects that are not novel. The board that maximizes firm value is either conservative or neutral (has interests aligned with the shareholders) and always overinvests in innovations. Boards with greater expertise are more likely to be conservative, but their bias is less severe. The board’s commitment power and bias are substitutes.

show abstract

Information Leaks and Voluntary Disclosure

Cited by 4 publications

References 31 publications

Content Analysis of Voluntary Disclosures on Cybersecurity in Malaysia

Content Analysis of Voluntary Disclosures on Cybersecurity in Malaysia

The effect of exogenous information on voluntary disclosure and market quality

Board bias, information, and investment efficiency

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About