2017
DOI: 10.1109/jsac.2017.2659078
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Information Credibility Modeling in Cooperative Networks: Equilibrium and Mechanism Design

Abstract: Abstract-In a cooperative network the user equipment (UE) share information with each other for cooperatively achieving a common goal. However, owing to the concerns of privacy or cost, UEs may be reluctant to share genuine information, which raises the information credibility problem addressed. Diverse techniques have been proposed for enhancing the information credibility in various scenarios. However, there is paucity of information on modeling the UEs' decision making behavior, namely as to whether they ar… Show more

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Cited by 18 publications
(12 citation statements)
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References 47 publications
(52 reference statements)
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“…The presented prototype includes a risk mitigation module which uses adaptive anonymization operations implemented on top of ARX . Another example is the work by Jiang et al, in which game‐theoretic methods have been used to develop a credibility model in cooperative networks and ARX has been included in the evaluation . The development of new data anonymization methods is another area in which ARX is frequently utilized.…”
Section: Summary and Practical Experiencesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The presented prototype includes a risk mitigation module which uses adaptive anonymization operations implemented on top of ARX . Another example is the work by Jiang et al, in which game‐theoretic methods have been used to develop a credibility model in cooperative networks and ARX has been included in the evaluation . The development of new data anonymization methods is another area in which ARX is frequently utilized.…”
Section: Summary and Practical Experiencesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To calculate each user's influential power, we develop a social power function F( ), in line with some properties. Under diverse scenarios, the function F( ) should obey the following three properties to effectively estimate each individual user's social power [17].…”
Section: Fog Controlled Socialmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The nondecreasing property simply implies that the more users are socially connected, the more outcome can be obtained. The saturation property suggests that when the social relationship is sufficient, any further increase of the outcome remains marginal [17]. In order to construct a function while satisfying above three properties, the social power function of , i.e., F ( ), is defined as follows:…”
Section: Fog Controlled Socialmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…4 Such valuation models the case of decreasing marginal valuation and is widely used in both classic mechanism design and its applications in the networking field [35]. Examples of such utilities can be found in [36]. The objective function b i (x i ) is twice differentiable and can be either concave or unimodal and concave in [0, x * i ], where x * i maximizes b i (x i ).…”
Section: The Network-centric Problem (Ncp)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…if R l i+ = ∅ or R l j+ = ∅ or S l+1Set l = l + 1 and exit with x l 33Set l = l + 1 and update δ l 35: end while36: return x l…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%