2010
DOI: 10.1007/s11225-010-9280-4
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Informal Proofs and Mathematical Rigour

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to provide epistemic reasons for investigating the notions of informal rigour and informal provability. I argue that the standard view of mathematical proof and rigour yields an implausible account of mathematical knowledge, and falls short of explaining the success of mathematical practice. I conclude that careful consideration of mathematical practice urges us to pursue a theory of informal provability.

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Cited by 33 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…The worries of Rav (1999) and Weir (2016) about whether the process of filling in intermediate authors, I do not think an account like Hamami's can ultimately be successful, though I do not have space to discuss it in detail here. 3 As illustrations of the objections, and the calls for improvement, see for instance Rav (1999), Rav (2007), Celluci (2009), Detlefsen (2009), Leitgeb (2009), Pelc (2009), Goethe & Friend (2010), Antonutti Marfori (2010), Larvor (2012), Weir (2016), De Toffoli & Giardino (2016, and Larvor (2019). 4 The account developed here is a fuller version of that sketched in Tatton- Brown (2019).…”
Section: §1 Introductionmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…The worries of Rav (1999) and Weir (2016) about whether the process of filling in intermediate authors, I do not think an account like Hamami's can ultimately be successful, though I do not have space to discuss it in detail here. 3 As illustrations of the objections, and the calls for improvement, see for instance Rav (1999), Rav (2007), Celluci (2009), Detlefsen (2009), Leitgeb (2009), Pelc (2009), Goethe & Friend (2010), Antonutti Marfori (2010), Larvor (2012), Weir (2016), De Toffoli & Giardino (2016, and Larvor (2019). 4 The account developed here is a fuller version of that sketched in Tatton- Brown (2019).…”
Section: §1 Introductionmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…We will not assume that proofs need to be formalisable, for discussion, see Avigad (2008), Antonutti Marfori (2010) and Tanswell (2015). 9 Wittgenstein discusses surveyability throughout the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1956).…”
Section: From Individual To Social Features Of Proofsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“… 8 We will not assume that proofs need to be formalisable, for discussion, see Avigad (2008), Antonutti Marfori (2010) and Tanswell (2015). …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Informal arguments typically depend on their logical form as well as on their content and contexts. Informal proves cannot be expressed in a general logical language (i.e., by explicitly defined well-formed formulae), and cannot be applied successively on explicitly specified logical inference rules or axioms [41].…”
Section: Achieving System-level Holism In Reasoning and Decision Makingmentioning
confidence: 99%