Informal Coalitions and Policymaking in Latin America

Acosta, Andrés Mejía

doi:10.4324/9780203878989

Cited by 43 publications

(17 citation statements)

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“…At the observed minimum value of presidents' support in legislature , a change in opposition fragmentation from its minimum to mean values means presidents are likely to include 2.4 additional nonpartisan ministers on average (9% of the average size of the cabinet), holding all others constant. This finding is in line with Mejía Acosta's () study of Latin American democracies, where minority presidents may appoint many nonpartisan ministers when facing a fragmented opposition in the legislature.…”

Section: Methodssupporting

confidence: 89%

Executive capacity to control legislatures and presidential choice of cabinet ministers in East Asian democracies

Lee

2018

Governance

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How do presidents in new democracies choose cabinet ministers to accomplish their policy goals? Contrary to existing studies explaining the partisan composition of the cabinet with institutional characteristics, such as formal authority, we argue that the broader political context surrounding the president's ability to control the legislature can affect cabinet partisanship. By analyzing original data on cabinet formation in all presidential systems in East Asia since democratization, we find that when presidents are more likely to be dominant in executive–legislative relations, they have less concern about legislative support and more leeway to focus on policy performance by appointing nonpartisan cabinet members. This analysis suggests that understanding cabinet partisanship requires a view of cabinet appointments as a trade‐off between securing legislative support and managing policy performance, and the scope of this compromise depends on the strength of the president vis‐à‐vis the legislature.

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Section: Methodssupporting

confidence: 89%

Executive capacity to control legislatures and presidential choice of cabinet ministers in East Asian democracies

Lee

2018

Governance

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“…Another possible explanation is that, as presidents are weak in terms of parliamentary support, the alternative is to seek governing coalitions where reforms of the judicial branch and a resulting redistribution of power in this arena are part of the exchanges to achieve legislative majorities. This explanation is coherent with the formation of informal government coalitions, as planted by Mejía Acosta (2009, 13‐4).…”

Section: A Model To Explain Institutional Change In the Supreme Courtsupporting

confidence: 71%

“…As a result, while the number of actors seeking political influence and representation increased, the amount of public resources for distribution—and in some cases for patronage and pork barrel—remained constant. As such, political agreements became fragile, political confrontation increased, and the mechanisms to enforce these agreements gradually became diluted, to that point that in countries, such as Ecuador, government coalitions became known as “mobile majorities,” alluding to their temporary and sporadic existence (Basabe‐Serrano, Pachano, and Mejía Acosta 2010, 69‐70; Mejía Acosta 2009, 125‐6).…”

Section: The Judicial Arena As a Space For Resolving Political Conflictsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Presidential Power and the Judicialization of Politics as Determinants of Institutional Change in the Judiciary: The Supreme Court of Ecuador (1979‐2009)

Basabe‐Serrano¹

2012

Politics & Policy

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What explains institutional instability in national judicial institutions? Much extant research focuses on de facto institutional instability, emphasizing political motivations behind irregular changes to high court composition. In contrast, I consider the causes for de jure changes made to the Ecuadorian Supreme Court from 1979 to the present, drawing on qualitative and quantitative analyses. I contend that the judicialization of politics and presidential interest in stacking the courts are central explanatory factors, and that changes to the Supreme Court's institutional framework reflect implicit compromises and political arrangements negotiated by strategic political actors. As such, institutional reforms to national judicial institutions may be adopted to ameliorate conflict in the larger political sphere. Related Articles:“Constitutional Jurisdiction and the Consolidation of Democracy.” (2009) http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2008.00159.x/abstract “Political and Economic Liberty in Latin America: Can They Coexist?” (2004) http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2004.tb00179.x/abstract “The Impact of Divided Government on the Supreme Court Appointment Process.” (2011) http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2011.00325.x/abstract ¿Qué factores explican la inestabilidad institucional en los Poderes Judiciales nacionales? Al respecto, la mayoría de investigaciones focalizan en la inestabilidad institucional de facto, enfatizando en las motivaciones políticas que llevan a cambios en la composición de las cortes. En contraste, y recurriendo a un análisis cualitativo y cuantitativo, este artículo analiza las causas de los cambios de jure realizados en la Corte Suprema de Justicia del Ecuador desde 1979 hasta la fecha. El artículo propone que la judicialización de la política y el interés de los presidentes por controlar las cortes son los factores clave que explican tales cambios institucionales y que dichas variaciones en la Corte Suprema reflejan compromisos implícitos y acuerdos negociados por actores políticos estratégicos. Por tanto, las reformas institucionales a las cortes se adoptan a fin de aminorar el conflicto político suscitado en una esfera política más amplia.

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“…Una lectura razonable sugiere que el diseño constitucional trasladó importantes funciones a un órgano fácilmente cooptable desde "arriba", ya sea porque los miembros del CPCCS no tienen un vínculo orgánico o de lealtad con organización concreta de la sociedad civil, debido a su forma de elección (trátese de elección por méritos o de elección popular), o porque el enorme poder que ostentarían (sobre todo debido a sus facultades para controlar la designación de autoridades de control y scalización) generaría fuertes incentivos para que los actores políticos intenten hacerse con el control del CPCCS, como es de esperar, en una democracia en la que las instituciones meritocráticas han estado sometidas al poder político 58 .…”

Section: Conclusiónunclassified

Visiones contrapuestas de la participación ciudadana en el constitucionalismo ecuatoriano

Toledo

Bustamante

2018

Vniversitas

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Este artículo plantea una reflexión sobre las premisas de la democracia participativa en el constitucionalismo ecuatoriano. Recurriendo a una interpretación dinámica de la Constitución de 2008, logra evidenciar dos visiones contrapuestas de la participación ciudadana, que implican fuertes tensiones entre una parte dogmática altamente comprometida con los ideales de la democracia participativa, y un régimen político constitucional, que contradice dichos ideales, al favorecer la concentración del poder en instituciones políticas distantes del control ciudadano.

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Informal Coalitions and Policymaking in Latin America

Cited by 43 publications

References 0 publications

Executive capacity to control legislatures and presidential choice of cabinet ministers in East Asian democracies

Executive capacity to control legislatures and presidential choice of cabinet ministers in East Asian democracies

Presidential Power and the Judicialization of Politics as Determinants of Institutional Change in the Judiciary: The Supreme Court of Ecuador (1979‐2009)

Visiones contrapuestas de la participación ciudadana en el constitucionalismo ecuatoriano

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