Inflation is Always and Everywhere a Monetary Phenomenon: Richmond vs. Houston in 1864

Abstract

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Do regions matter? An integrated institutional and semiglobalization perspective on the internationalization of MNEs

“…Thus, the role of capital investments has also been heralded as a key determinant of FDI (Agarwal, ) because they create spillovers for MNEs and shape demand for and supply of resources, which in turn influence firms' strategic and tactical actions (Burdekin and Weidenmier, ; Orphanides, ). Capital investments often create spillover effects from which MNEs can benefit.…”

Suppressing Asset Price Inflation: The Confederate Experience, 1861–1865

“…The premium on the 8% bonds in terms of Confederate currency rose mildly to around 15% at the end of 1863. But, as discussed in Burdekin and Weidenmier (2001), the gold premium began to soar in late 1863, reaching 20:1 in Richmond on 2 January 1864. As a last resort, the Confederate government passed the 17 February 1864 act that mandated that most Confederate Treasury notes then outstanding be exchanged for 4% bonds by 1 April 1864 or else face a 33 1/3%``tax.''…”

“…Thereafter these notes, together with all subsequent notes issued after 1 December 1862, would be exchangeable 1. See Burdekin and Weidenmier (2001) and Weidenmier (2002). Earlier research has been hampered by the lack of a reliable series on the gold value of Confederate currency with, for example, McCandless (1996) relying on a newspaper column of unknown origin that differs significantly from actual trades reported in contemporary Richmond papers.…”

Gunboats, reputation, and sovereign repayment: lessons from the Southern Confederacy

“…Subsequent bond issues proved less fruitful as Confederate investors sought to unload their money balances by purchasing commodities rather than government obligations. The Confederacy resorted to funding acts that artificially increased bond demand by compelling citizens to exchange money for bonds (Burdekin and Weidenmier, 2001). Ball (1991) estimated that debt issue accounted for approximately 33% of Confederate revenues during the war.…”