2015
DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhv032
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Inferring Anticompetitive Price Effects From Difference-in-Difference Analysis: A Caveat

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Cited by 5 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…The final part of the robustness check applies for the complementary analysis of the DiD model proposed by Ulrick and Sacher (2015) to make sure the estimated DiD effect is not spurious. These authors argue that a positive and significant estimator of the interaction term in the DiD model is not a sufficient condition for concluding a causal effect.…”
Section: Sensitivity Analysis Of the Outcome Distributionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The final part of the robustness check applies for the complementary analysis of the DiD model proposed by Ulrick and Sacher (2015) to make sure the estimated DiD effect is not spurious. These authors argue that a positive and significant estimator of the interaction term in the DiD model is not a sufficient condition for concluding a causal effect.…”
Section: Sensitivity Analysis Of the Outcome Distributionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The author proposed a complementary analysis to check the proportion of the sample in the treatment group in the outcome distribution. To implement the approach proposed by Ulrick and Sacher (2015), Table VII presents the proportion of treatment group in each quartile of the distribution for ADR, AOR and RevPAR, respectively.…”
Section: Sensitivity Analysis Of the Outcome Distributionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An analogy is the growth in infants from 6 to 12 months of age: Half of the babies will experience above average growth. Because half of price changes are above average, merely finding an above average price change cannot by itself signify an anticompetitive price increase ( see Ulrick and Sacher 2015). The prime issue is judging how atypical Keystone's price increases are among the observed changes in the control groups.…”
Section: Merger Effectsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“… See Ulrick and Sacher (2015), p. 1004. See also the discussion in Section 3.2 infra , where we discuss how physician contracts specify pricing by a myriad of mechanisms. …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%