In this paper, we examine the growth effects of government expenditure for a panel of 30 developing countries over the 1970s and 1980s, with a particular focus on disaggregated government expenditures. Our methodology improves on previous research on this topic by explicitly recognizing the role of the government budget constraint and the possible biases arising from omitted variables. Our primary results are twofold. First, the share of government capital expenditure in GDP is positively and significantly correlated with economic growth, but current expenditure is insignificant. Second, at the disaggregated level, government investment in education and total expenditures in education are the only outlays that are significantly associated with growth once the budget constraint and omitted variables are taken into consideration. Copyright � 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation � 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester.

Economic development and bureaucratic corruption are determined jointly in a dynamic general equilibrium model of growth, bribery and tax evasion. Corruption arises from the incentives of public and private agents to conspire in the concealment of information from the government. These incentives depend on aggregate economic activity which, in turn, depends on the incidence of corruption. The model produces multiple development regimes, transition between which may or may not occur. In accordance with recent empirical evidence, the relationship between corruption and development is predicted to be negative. r

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This paper presents an analysis of the joint determination of bureaucratic corruption and economic development. The analysis is based on a simple neo-classical growth model in which bureaucrats are employed as agents of the government to collect taxes from households. Corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with households to provide false information to the government. Costly concealment of this activity leads to a loss of resources available for productive investments. The incentive for an individual bureaucrat to accept a bribe depends on the number of other bureaucrats who are expected to accept bribes. This strategic interaction in bureaucratic decision making produces multiple (frequency-dependent) equilibria associated with different incidences of corruption. The predictions of the model accord strongly with recent empirical evidence. * The authors are grateful for the financial support of the ESRC (grant no. L138251030). The usual disclaimer applies.

We present a dynamic general equilibrium analysis of public sector corruption and economic growth. In an economy with government intervention and capital accumulation, state-appointed bureaucrats are responsibile for procuring public goods which contribute to productive efficiency. Corruption arises because of an opportunity for bureaucrats to appropriate public funds by misinforming the government about the cost and quality of public goods provision. The incentive for each bureaucrat to do this depends on economy-wide outcomes which, in turn, depend on the behaviour of all bureaucrats. We establish the existence of multiple development regimes, together with the possibility of multiple, frequency-dependent equilibria. The predictions of our analysis accord strongly with recent empirical evidence.