Inequality and outside options in common-property resource use

Tarui, Nori

doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.01.002

Cited by 14 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 34 publications

(26 reference statements)

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“…Finally, Tarui (2007) finds, in an overlapping-generations framework relying upon punishment strategies, that heterogeneity in agent productivity reduces the ability of agents to achieve a sustainable harvest when harvests are shared equally amongst agents. Sherstyuk (1998), in a special case of partnerships with heterogeneous agents and no effort choice, and thus no shirking, finds that partnerships can be stable and efficient, but only when they are segregated by 'ability,' in contrast to the results suggested here.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Putting free-riding to work: A Partnership Solution to the common-property problem

Heintzelman

Salant

Schott

2009

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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The common-property problem results in excessive mining, hunting, and extraction of oil and water. The same phenomenon is also responsible for excessive investment in R&D and excessive outlays in rent-seeking contests. We propose a "Partnership Solution" to eliminate or at least mitigate these excesses. Each of N players joins a partnership in the first stage and chooses his effort in the second stage. Under the rules of a partnership, each member must pay his own cost of effort but receives an equal share of the partnership's revenue. The incentive to free-ride created by such partnerships turns out to be beneficial since it naturally offsets the excessive effort inherent in such problems. In our two-stage game, this institutional arrangement can, under specified circumstances, induce the social optimum in a subgame-perfect equilibrium: no one has a unilateral incentive (1) to switch to another partnership (or create a new partnership) in the first stage or (2) to

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Putting free-riding to work: A Partnership Solution to the common-property problem

Heintzelman

Salant

Schott

2009

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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“…Demsetz (1967) and much of the resulting law and economics literature is primarily concerned with this latter case as is the literature that views property rights as the outcome of cooperation in dynamic games. For a recent contribution in this area see Tarui (2007). It is however unclear whether the rent dissipation we observe around the world arises from monitoring problems or a true lack of property rights.…”

Section: The Steady State Economymentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade, Tragedy, and the Commons

Copeland

Taylor

2009

American Economic Review

135

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We develop a theory of resource management where the degree to which countries escape the tragedy of the commons, and hence the de facto property rights regime, is endogenously determined. Three forces determine success or failure in resource management: the regulator's enforcement power, the extent of harvesting capacity, and the ability of the resource to generate competitive returns without being extinguished. The model can explain heterogeneity across countries and resources in the e¤ectiveness of resource management, and it predicts that changes in prices, population, and technology can cause transitions to better or worse management regimes. Policy analysis based on the assumption of a …xed degree of property rights protection may lead to serious error.We are grateful to many people for comments on earlier versions, and participants at

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“…Tarui (2007) proposed a perfection equilibrium model employing the dynamic intergenerational gaming approach. The model supported a cooperative utilization of public resources between intergenerational users.…”

Section: Research Progress On Intergenerational (Equity) Equilibrium mentioning

confidence: 99%

Development of Future Generations: Oriented Virtual Negotiation Support System for Intergenerational Conflict

Zhang

Zhong

Xue

2008

Chinese Journal of Population Resources and Environment

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Inequality and outside options in common-property resource use

Cited by 14 publications

References 34 publications

Putting free-riding to work: A Partnership Solution to the common-property problem

Putting free-riding to work: A Partnership Solution to the common-property problem

Trade, Tragedy, and the Commons

Development of Future Generations: Oriented Virtual Negotiation Support System for Intergenerational Conflict

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