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In this paper, we analyze the problem faced by impatient researchers attempting to balance the considerations of journal quality, submission lags, and acceptance probabilities in choosing appropriate outlets for their work. We first study the case in which probabilities of submission outcomes are exogenous parameters and show that authors can find the optimal submission path through the use of journal 'scores' based only on the journals' characteristics and the author's degree of impatience. Then, we analyze a more realistic framework in which acceptance probability is determined by the quality of the manuscript, in which the reviewing process may be imperfect, and in which authors may not be certain of the manuscript's quality. Throughout, we illustrate our analysis with data on actual economics journals. We also consider the problem of journals facing a large number of submissions, limited space, and limited resources to review papers and, in particular, we examine the relative effectiveness of using submission fees and reviewing lags to ration article submissions.

The common-property problem results in excessive mining, hunting, and extraction of oil and water. The same phenomenon is also responsible for excessive investment in R&D and excessive outlays in rent-seeking contests. We propose a "Partnership Solution" to eliminate or at least mitigate these excesses. Each of N players joins a partnership in the first stage and chooses his effort in the second stage. Under the rules of a partnership, each member must pay his own cost of effort but receives an equal share of the partnership's revenue. The incentive to free-ride created by such partnerships turns out to be beneficial since it naturally offsets the excessive effort inherent in such problems. In our two-stage game, this institutional arrangement can, under specified circumstances, induce the social optimum in a subgame-perfect equilibrium: no one has a unilateral incentive (1) to switch to another partnership (or create a new partnership) in the first stage or (2) to

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