Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness

Gilens, Martin

doi:10.1093/poq/nfi058

Cited by 564 publications

(371 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…In diesen neueren Studien haben vor allem US-amerikanische Autoren untersucht, inwiefern sich ökonomische Ungleichheit in politische Ungleichheit übersetzt. Sie zeigen, dass sozial Benachteiligte kaum Einfluss auf den politischen Prozess haben, und warnen deshalb vor den Folgen steigender sozialer Ungleichheit für die Demokratie (Bartels 2008;Flavin 2012;Gilens 2005Gilens , 2012Gilens und Page 2014). Angestoßen wird die neue Responsivitätsforschung durch die Analysen von Martin Gilens (2005Gilens ( , 2012 (Gilens 2009, S. 340) und es zudem oftmals besonders wichtige Themen sind, in denen sich die Gruppen konträr gegenüberstehen (Gilens 2015b).…”

Section: Forschungsstandunclassified

Government for the People? – Unequal Responsiveness of the Bundestag

2017

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Government for the People? -Unequal Responsiveness of the BundestagAbstract Democratic systems face a steady tension between formal political equality and actual inequalities of their citizens. If disadvantaged groups cannot hope that their interests will have an equal chance to prevail against those of more privileged groups in society, a key principle of democracy is violated. New studies on political responsiveness analyze whether or not decisions confirm to the citizens' will and if so, whose preferences prevails. A number of studies focusing on the United States have found a pattern of selective responsiveness, in which the interests of the poor and median income groups are mostly ignored. In this article, we ask whether similar patterns are discernible in Germany. We analyze an original dataset of 252 detailed survey questions posed between 1998 and 2013. The questions deal with specific political decisions debated at the time and cover a broad range of politically relevant topics. Our results show a notable association between political decisions and the opinions of the rich, but none or even a negative association for the poor. Representational inequality in Germany thus resembles the findings for the US case, despite its very different institutional setting. Against this background, we conclude by discussing potential mechanisms of unequal responsiveness.

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Section: Forschungsstandunclassified

Government for the People? – Unequal Responsiveness of the Bundestag

2017

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“…Much of this literature has focused on the United States (e.g. Bartels 2008;Gilens 2005Gilens , 2012. Although recent studies broaden this focus to Germany (Fortin-Rittberger and Eder 2013), Switzerland (Rosset 2013), and larger sets of countries (Reynolds 2013;Rosset et al 2013), unequal responsiveness has scarcely been investigated in the European context.…”

Section: Differential Responsiveness In Europementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Especially Larry Bartels and Martin Gilens have been concerned with inequality in the United States, and the possibility that some groups are better represented than others. They (Bartels 2008;Gilens 2005Gilens , 2012 find such a bias in responsiveness: the preferences of the rich appear to be systematically better represented than those of the poor. Furthermore, Enns and Wlezien (2011) disentangle differential responsiveness by focusing on various groups.…”

Section: Representative Democracy and Inequalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Differential Responsiveness in Europe: The Effects of Preference Difference and Electoral Participation

Peters¹,

Ensink²

2014

West European Politics

113

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“…Moreover, growing economic inequality has amplified the general discontent with politicians, since the political elite is said to belong to the top of the income distribution, separating it from the average citizen (Gilens, 2005;Solt, 2008). 2 However, from a theoretical point of view, the citizen candidate framework suggests an income premium for politicians as a compensation for the uncertainty of (re)election as well as for campaigning costs (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996;Besley and Coate, 1997).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The politicians’ wage gap: insights from German members of parliament

2012

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Using a unique dataset of German members of parliament (MPs) this paper analyzes the politicians' wage gap (PWG). After controlling for observable characteristics as well as accounting for election probabilities and campaigning costs, we find a positive income premium for MPs which is statistically and economically significant. Our results are consistent with the citizen candidate model: The PWG amounts to 35-65% when comparing MPs to citizens in an executive position. However, it shrinks to zero when restricting the control group to top-level executives. This suggests that German politicians do not receive excessive pay when compared to senior executives.JEL Classification: D72, H11, H83, J31, J45

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Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness

Cited by 564 publications

References 29 publications

Government for the People? – Unequal Responsiveness of the Bundestag

Government for the People? – Unequal Responsiveness of the Bundestag

Differential Responsiveness in Europe: The Effects of Preference Difference and Electoral Participation

The politicians’ wage gap: insights from German members of parliament

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