Inductive knowledge and lotteries: Could one explain both ‘safely’?

Zhao, Haicheng; Baumann, Peter

doi:10.1111/rati.12296

Ratio

2020

DOI: 10.1111/rati.12296

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Inductive knowledge and lotteries: Could one explain both ‘safely’?

Haicheng Zhao

Peter Baumann²

Abstract: Many find it an attractive idea that if one knows that p, one's belief that p must be safe-that is, the belief could not easily have been false (e.g., Pritchard, 2012;Sosa, 1999;Williamson, 2000). In terms of possible world semantics, a safe belief is true in the actual world, as well as in relevantly close possible worlds. Now, depending on the scope of 'close possible worlds', safety typically comes in the following varieties:

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Cited by 4 publications

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“… 17 Zhao (2020 b ), Zhao and Baumann (Forthcoming) argue that an account like SAA also addresses some other objections to safety.…”

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confidence: 99%

How to Play the Lottery Safely?

Zhao

2020

Episteme

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According to the safety principle, if one knows that p, one's belief that p could not easily have been false. One problem besetting this principle is the lottery problem – that of explaining why one does not seem to know that one will lose the lottery purely based on probabilistic considerations, prior to the announcement of the lottery result. As Greco points out, it is difficult for a safety theorist to solve this problem, without paying a heavy price. In this paper, I first reject three existing safety-based solutions to the lottery problem, due to Pritchard, Sosa, and Broncano-Berrocal. Failure of these accounts reveals that there is something crucial missing in the safety principle. By way of remedying this, I propose to integrate a safety principle with a condition regarding one's own awareness of (nearby) error-possibilities. The resulting account, as I argue, enjoys a number of theoretical advantages, including its capacity to handle the lottery problem.

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“… 17 Zhao (2020 b ), Zhao and Baumann (Forthcoming) argue that an account like SAA also addresses some other objections to safety.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Play the Lottery Safely?

Zhao

2020

Episteme

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Safety and Unawareness of Error-Possibility

Zhao

2021

Philosophical Papers

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Sensitivity, Safety, and Epistemic Closure

2022

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

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It has been argued that an advantage of the safety account over the sensitivity account is that the safety account preserves epistemic closure; while the sensitivity account implies epistemic closure failure. However, the argument fails to take the method-relativity of the modal conditions on knowledge, viz, sensitivity and safety, into account. In this paper, I argue that the sensitivity account and the safety account are on a par with respect to epistemic closure once the method-relativity of the modal conditions is taken into account. Therefore, epistemic closure is no longer an arbiter in the debate. KeywordsBelief-formation methods • Competent deduction • Epistemic closure • Inferential beliefs • Knowledge • Safety • Sensitivity • The generality problem sensitivity account of knowledge 1 and the safety account of knowledge 2 .Though both accounts handle a wide range of cases involving knowledge-precluding epistemic luck as well as cases of knowledge, 3 it has been argued that an advantage of the safety account over the sensitivity account is that the safety account preserves epistemic closure; while the sensitivity account implies epistemic closure failure. In this paper, I demonstrate that such an argument fails to take into account that the modal conditions are usually relativized to belief-formation methods. Once we take the method-relativity of the modal conditions into account, it should be clear to us that the sensitivity account and the safety account are on a par with respect to epistemic closure, viz., either both accounts preserve epistemic closure or both accounts imply epistemic closure failure. Therefore, epistemic closure cannot be used to adjudicate between the sensitivity and the safety accounts of knowledge. 4

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Inductive knowledge and lotteries: Could one explain both ‘safely’?

Cited by 4 publications

References 21 publications

How to Play the Lottery Safely?

How to Play the Lottery Safely?

Safety and Unawareness of Error-Possibility

Sensitivity, Safety, and Epistemic Closure

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