Individuation

Thiel, Udo

doi:10.1017/chol9780521307635.011

Cited by 34 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 434 publications

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“…When motion is introduced into this matter and moves its parts in an infinity of ways, behold then an infinity of different bodies. (Dialogues,10.12,184) 20 19 For discussion, see Anderson (1976, 203-5), Thiel (1998a), Garber, Henry eta!. (1998), and Lennon (1980, 814-15).…”

Section: Malebranche's Doctrine Of Continuous Creationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Does Continuous Creation Entail Occasionalism? Malebranche (and Descartes)

Pessin

2000

Can. J. of Philosophy

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‘God needs no instruments to act,’ Malebranche writes in Search 6.2.3; “it suffices that He wills in order that a thing be, because it is a contradiction that He should will and that what He wills should not happen. Therefore, His power is His will” (450). After nearly identical language in Treatise 1.12, Malebranche writes that “[God's] wills are necessarily efficacious … His power differs not at all from His will” (116). God exercises His causal power, here, via His volitions; what He causes depends not merely on the fact that He wills, but specifically (since volitions are intentional states) on the content of His volitions, on “what He wills.” Yet despite the obviously key role the ordinary notion of volitional content plays for Malebranche, recent writers have paid surprisingly little attention either to it or its exegetical implications. I hope partly to rectify this situation here.The plan of this paper is this:(I) to borrow current work in the philosophy of mind to sketch the notion of an incomplete volition, i.e. one whose content is ‘incomplete’ in a sense to be explained;(II) to note that Malebranche accepts and uses something like this notion;

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Section: Malebranche's Doctrine Of Continuous Creationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(Cf. Thiel [1998a] and[1998b] for further discussion.) Barring specific evidence to the contrary, it's plausible to assume that the same is true for Malebranche.…”

Section: Malebranche's Doctrine Of Continuous Creationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Continuous Creation Entail Occasionalism? Malebranche (and Descartes)

Pessin

2000

Can. J. of Philosophy

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“…5, Noonan 1978, Curley 1982und Thiel 1983. Thiel hat zwar eine relativistische Interpretation bis vor Kurzem vertreten (Thiel 1998 3), hält sie aber nunmehr, wie er mir mündlich mitgeteilt hat, nicht mehr für die plausibelste Lesart von Lockes Identitätskonzeption. Ein vielleicht letzter Verfechter der relativistischen Interpretationdem ich mich anschließeist Stuart (Stuart 2013 (Sergeant 1984(Sergeant [1697, Reflexion 14, §12, 265).…”

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Im Namen der Dinge - John Locke und der Begriff des Wesens

Wörner¹

2019

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Indem Locke die Unterscheidung zwischen deutlichen und verworrenen Ideen auf eine neue, auf Sprache bezogene Weise auffasst, entwickelt er einen sprachphilosophischen Zugang zu metaphysischen Fragen. Dieser Zugang erlaubt es ihm, die traditionellen metaphysischen Grundbegriffe des Wesens, der Identität und der Substanz neu zu fassen – und mit seiner empiristischen Erkenntnistheorie in Einklang zu bringen. Auf der Grundlage einer solchen Interpretation lässt sich zeigen, so die Kernthese von Im Namen der Dinge, dass Lockes verstreute metaphysische Überlegungen eine kohärente metaphysische Theorie des Wesens der Dinge bilden. Entgegen einer weitverbreiteten Einschätzung erweist sich Locke damit als Philosoph, der die metaphysischen Systeme der späten Scholastik und der frühneuzeitlichen Rationalisten nicht nur kritisiert, sondern auch auf eine sehr interessante Weise weiterentwickelt hat.

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“…Geach (), Langtry (), Borowski (), Mackie (), Curley (), and Thiel () also give relative identity readings of Locke.…”

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confidence: 99%

Locke's Place‐Time‐Kind Principle

Gordon‐Roth

2015

Philosophy Compass

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John Locke discusses the notions of identity and diversity in Book 2, Chapter 27 of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. At the beginning of this much-discussed chapter, Locke posits the place-time-kind principle. According to this principle, no two things of the same kind can be in the same place at the same time (2.27.1). Just what Locke means by this is unclear, however. So too is whether this principle causes problems for Locke, and whether these problems can be resolved. This is significant because the placetime-kind principle is foundational to Locke's discussion of identity. Moreover, the place-time-kind principle stands at the center of a number of lively and long-standing debates in Locke scholarship. These include the debates over the ontological status of Lockean persons, and whether Locke is a relative identity theorist, to name just two. In this paper, I offer a survey of how Locke's place-time-kind principle has been interpreted in the secondary literature. The aim of this taxonomy is to clarify where the differences between competing interpretations lie, and additionally show just how challenging it is to determine which reading is best.

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Individuation

Cited by 34 publications

References 434 publications

Does Continuous Creation Entail Occasionalism? Malebranche (and Descartes)

Does Continuous Creation Entail Occasionalism? Malebranche (and Descartes)

Im Namen der Dinge - John Locke und der Begriff des Wesens

Locke's Place‐Time‐Kind Principle

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