The identity of indiscernibles (PII) states that indiscernible objects must be identical. Many philosophers have held that the PII turns out to be either true but trivial, or non-trivial but false, depending on how the notion of (in)discernibility is spelled out. In this paper, I propose and defend an account of this notion which aims to yield a minimally non-trivial and yet plausible version of the PII. I argue moreover that this version of the principle is immune to a number of well-known and recent objections to the PII.
Indem Locke die Unterscheidung zwischen deutlichen und verworrenen Ideen auf eine neue, auf Sprache bezogene Weise auffasst, entwickelt er einen sprachphilosophischen Zugang zu metaphysischen Fragen. Dieser Zugang erlaubt es ihm, die traditionellen metaphysischen Grundbegriffe des Wesens, der Identität und der Substanz neu zu fassen – und mit seiner empiristischen Erkenntnistheorie in Einklang zu bringen. Auf der Grundlage einer solchen Interpretation lässt sich zeigen, so die Kernthese von Im Namen der Dinge, dass Lockes verstreute metaphysische Überlegungen eine kohärente metaphysische Theorie des Wesens der Dinge bilden. Entgegen einer weitverbreiteten Einschätzung erweist sich Locke damit als Philosoph, der die metaphysischen Systeme der späten Scholastik und der frühneuzeitlichen Rationalisten nicht nur kritisiert, sondern auch auf eine sehr interessante Weise weiterentwickelt hat.
In this paper I examine Locke’s criticism of the view that some species of natural objects are determined by real essences, a view I call species realism. Most commentators have focused either on Locke’s putative objections to the realist’s claim that species determining real essences exist or on his semantic case against the assumption that our species terms can refer to real essences that determine species. I identify another objection, which, I argue, is independent from both of these lines of criticism. This objection is essentially practical. It is based on the claim that adopting species realism has detrimental practical consequences: it undermines, Locke believes, our ability to sort particular natural objects into species. This alone, he argues, is already sufficient to set aside and ignore species realism when trying to sort objects into species.
I argue that Locke’s distinction between ‘determined’ and ‘undetermined’ ideas incorporates an account of semantic indeterminacy: if the complex idea to which a general term is annexed is ‘undetermined’, the term lacks a determinate extension. I propose that a closer look at this account of semantic indeterminacy illuminates various charges of confusion, misuse and abuse of language Locke levels against his philosophical contemporaries.
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