Individual heterogeneity and costly punishment: a volunteer's dilemma

Przepiorka, Wojtek; Diekmann, Andreas

doi:10.1098/rspb.2013.0247

Cited by 70 publications

(70 citation statements)

References 43 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…However, because only one or a few individuals need to punish defectors in order to maintain high levels of cooperation within a group, punishment in nplayer public goods games can also be studied as a volunteer's dilemma (Przepiorka & Diekmann, 2013;Raihani & Bshary, 2011). The benefit of punishment is then a non-linear function of the number of punishers, i.e.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups

Santos

Wedekind

2015

Evolution and Human Behavior

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Citation: dos Santos M., Wedekind C. 2015. Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups. Evolution and Human Behavior 36(1): 59-64.The content of this preprint is identical with the published paper except from small edits made at proofs. AbstractCooperation among unrelated individuals can arise if decisions to help others can be based on reputation. While working for dyadic interactions, reputation-use in social dilemmas involving many individuals (e.g. public goods games) becomes increasingly difficult as groups become larger and errors more frequent. Reputation is therefore believed to have played a minor role for the evolution of cooperation in collective action dilemmas such as those faced by early humans. Here, we show in computer simulations that a reputation system based on punitive actions can overcome these problems and, compared to reputation system based on generous actions, (i) is more likely to lead to the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups, (ii) more effectively sustains cooperation within larger groups, and (iii) is more robust to errors in reputation assessment. Punishment and punishment reputation could therefore have played crucial roles in the evolution of cooperation within larger groups of humans.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups

Santos

Wedekind

2015

Evolution and Human Behavior

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…To illustrate the possible strategic considerations of the players, let us calculate the symmetric subgame perfect equilibria for the one-shot public good game. (i) Without second-order punishment, the decision to pay taxes becomes a volunteer's dilemma (41)(42)(43): subjects benefit from the presence of a punishment authority, but they want others to pay the taxes. The symmetric solution to this dilemma is to pay taxes with a certain probability q T .…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishment

Hilbe

Traulsen

Röhl

et al. 2013

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Individuals usually punish free riders but refuse to sanction those who cooperate but do not punish. This missing second-order peer punishment is a fundamental problem for the stabilization of cooperation. To solve this problem, most societies today have implemented central authorities that punish free riders and tax evaders alike, such that second-order punishment is fully established. The emergence of such stable authorities from individual decisions, however, creates a new paradox: it seems absurd to expect individuals who do not engage in second-order punishment to strive for an authority that does. Herein, we provide a mathematical model and experimental results from a public goods game where subjects can choose between a community with and without second-order punishment in two different ways. When subjects can migrate continuously to either community, we identify a bias toward institutions that do not punish tax evaders. When subjects have to vote once for all rounds of the game and have to accept the decision of the majority, they prefer a society with second-order punishment. These findings uncover the existence of a democracy premium. The majority-voting rule allows subjects to commit themselves and to implement institutions that eventually lead to a higher welfare for all.evolution of cooperation | pool punishment | institution formation T he success of collective action and the maintenance of commonly shared infrastructure is often endangered by free riders, subjects who reap the benefits of public goods without contributing to them (1, 2). To mitigate the free riders' destructive potential, many communities install specialized authorities that monitor the subjects' behavior and sanction wrong-doers (3-7). Examples, such as modern courts and the police system, indicate that the maintenance of such institutions is costly. They also constitute a commonly shared infrastructure, which can be exploited just as the original public good that the institution was designed for to protect. Thus, a second-order dilemma arises.Second-order dilemmas appear in various forms and are considered as a serious obstacle to the evolution of cooperation (8-10). For example, in the absence of a policing authority, group members may take the job onto themselves, punishing others directly. There is overwhelming evidence that subjects are willing to sanction free riders at a cost to themselves (11-14), although individuals typically refuse to exert second-order punishment (15). However, peer punishment can have detrimental consequences on welfare, as the punishment costs may override the benefits of increased cooperation (16) and due to the problems of antisocial punishment (17) and retaliation (18,19). Peer punishment may pay in the long run, but only when interactions take place in small and stable groups (20). These restrictions may be the reason why modern states have abolished decentralized sanctioning (21).To explain the transition from decentralized peer punishment to institutional pool punishment (22), recent theoretic...

show abstract

“…Among the !Kung, 'strong' individuals who are valued social partners (good hunters, musicians, healers) tend to coordinate enforcement of social norms [101]. Heterogeneity in punishment cost across individuals makes it easier to stabilize altruistic behaviour in the provisioning of a public good [102], and experiments indicate that group members tend to tacitly agree on the individual who can punish at least cost as punisher [103] and believe that dominant individuals can punish more successfully and with lower risk of retaliation [104]. Even where group members are equally motivated, greater strength or coalitional support on the part of leaders may reduce the effort and time required to solicit the joint attention of group members and to generate consensus regarding an action plan [1].…”

Section: (A) Leadership In Non-humansmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leadership solves collective action problems in small-scale societies

Glowacki

Rueden

2015

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

197

142

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

One contribution of 13 to a theme issue 'Solving the puzzle of collective action through inter-individual differences: evidence from primates and humans'. Observation of leadership in small-scale societies offers unique insights into the evolution of human collective action and the origins of sociopolitical complexity. Using behavioural data from the Tsimane forager-horticulturalists of Bolivia and Nyangatom nomadic pastoralists of Ethiopia, we evaluate the traits of leaders and the contexts in which leadership becomes more institutional. We find that leaders tend to have more capital, in the form of age-related knowledge, body size or social connections. These attributes can reduce the costs leaders incur and increase the efficacy of leadership. Leadership becomes more institutional in domains of collective action, such as resolution of intragroup conflict, where collective action failure threatens group integrity. Together these data support the hypothesis that leadership is an important means by which collective action problems are overcome in small-scale societies.

show abstract

Individual heterogeneity and costly punishment: a volunteer's dilemma

Cited by 70 publications

References 43 publications

Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups

Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups

Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishment

Leadership solves collective action problems in small-scale societies

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About