A mechanism for self-organization of the degree of connectivity in model neural networks is studied. Network connectivity is regulated locally on the basis of an order parameter of the global dynamics, which is estimated from an observable at the single synapse level. This principle is studied in a two-dimensional neural network with randomly wired asymmetric weights. In this class of networks, network connectivity is closely related to a phase transition between ordered and disordered dynamics. A slow topology change is imposed on the network through a local rewiring rule motivated by activity-dependent synaptic development: Neighbor neurons whose activity is correlated, on average develop a new connection while uncorrelated neighbors tend to disconnect. As a result, robust self-organization of the network towards the order disorder transition occurs. Convergence is independent of initial conditions, robust against thermal noise, and does not require fine tuning of parameters.

Extortion is the practice of obtaining advantages through explicit forces and threats. Recently, it was demonstrated that even the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, one of the key models to explain mutual cooperation, allows for implicit forms of extortion. According to the theory, extortioners demand and receive an excessive share of any surplus, which allows them to outperform any adapting co-player. To explore the performance of such strategies against humans, we have designed an economic experiment in which participants were matched either with an extortioner or with a generous co-player. Although extortioners succeeded against each of their human opponents, extortion resulted in lower payoffs than generosity. Human subjects showed a strong concern for fairness: they punished extortion by refusing to fully cooperate, thereby reducing their own, and even more so, the extortioner’s gains. Thus, the prospects of extorting others in social relationships seem limited; in the long run, generosity is more profitable.

Punishment can stabilize costly cooperation and ensure the success of a common project that is threatened by free-riders. Punishment mechanisms can be classified into pool punishment, where the punishment act is carried out by a paid third party, (e.g. a police system or a sheriff), and peer punishment, where the punishment act is carried out by peers. Which punishment mechanism is preferred when both are concurrently available within a society? In an economic experiment, we show that the majority of subjects choose pool punishment, despite being costly even in the absence of defectors, when second-order free-riders, cooperators that do not punish, are also punished. Pool punishers are mutually enforcing their support for the punishment organization, stably trapping each other. Our experimental results show how organized punishment could have displaced individual punishment in human societies.