Individual and Contextual Constraints on Ideological Labels in Latin America

Zechmeister, Elizabeth J.; Corral, Margarita

doi:10.1177/0010414012463880

Cited by 87 publications

(62 citation statements)

References 48 publications

(63 reference statements)

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“…In addition, as discussed above, respondents place themselves more frequently in a few "prominent" categories (five, six, seven). As such, the evidence presented in Figure 1 cast doubts over the findings of the aforementioned studies that do not account for differential item functioning (Colomber, 2005;Seligson, 2007;Arnold and Samuels, 2011;Remmer, 2012;Wiesehomeier and Doyle, 2012;Lupu, 2013;Zechmeister and Corral 2013).…”

Section: Figure 1 Recovered Estimates Of Ideology Versus Raw Self-plmentioning

confidence: 81%

“…A few studies, however, use public opinion data to identify the relationship between the beliefs and attitudes of Latin American citizens and the region's "left turn" (Colomer, 2005;Seligson, 2007;Arnold and Samuels, 2011;Remmer, 2012;Wiesehomeier and Doyle, 2012;Zechmeister and Corral, 2013). Drawing on self-reported measures of ideology, these studies find that most Latin American voters have a clear and coherent understanding of the ideological meaning of left and right.…”

Section: Latin America: a Representation Gap?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The findings call into question a number of studies that fail to account for the aforementioned interpersonal comparability problems in their analyses (Colomer, 2005;Seligson, 2007;Arnold and Samuels, 2011;Remmer, 2012;Wiesehomeier and Doyle, 2012;Lupu, 2013;Zechmeister and Corral, 2013). In this respect, this paper is closely related to Jessee (2010), Shor and Rogowski (2010), Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013), and Battista, Peress and Richman (2013), who use common items and scaling techniques to examine policy representation in the United States.…”

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confidence: 98%

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Partisanship, Ideology, and Representation in Latin America

Saiegh

2014

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. Terms of use: Documents inThe unauthorized commercial use of Bank documents is prohibited and may be punishable under the Bank's policies and/or applicable laws. Copyright ©Inter-American Development Bank. This working paper may be reproduced for any non-commercial purpose. It may also be reproduced in any academic journal indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, with previous consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. This paper uses joint scaling methods and similar items from three large-scale surveys to place voters, parties and politicians from different Latin American countries on a common ideological space. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the findings reveal that the "median" voter in Latin America is located to the left of the ideological spectrum, and that voters' ideological locations are highly correlated with their partisan attachments. The location of parties and leaders suggests that three distinctive clusters exist: one located at the left of the political spectrum, another at the center, and a third to the right. The results also indicate that legislators in Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru tend to be more "leftist" than their voters. The ideological drift, however, is not large enough to substantiate the claim that a representation gap exists in those countries. Cataloging-in-Publication JEL classifications: O54, C83, Y80

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Section: Figure 1 Recovered Estimates Of Ideology Versus Raw Self-plmentioning

confidence: 81%

Section: Latin America: a Representation Gap?mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 98%

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Partisanship, Ideology, and Representation in Latin America

Saiegh

2014

SSRN Journal

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“…Por lo tanto, también incluimos una segunda variable de anclaje, la ideología de izquierda-derecha. Zechmeister y Corral (2013), a partir de una evaluación de la autoubicación ideológica de entrevistados de la encuesta en 18 naciones latinoamericanas, reportaron que arriba del 80% de latinoamericanos, en promedio, se localizan a sí mismos en el continuo de izquierda-derecha [en términos de contenido de esa identificación ideológica, aparecen variaciones de país a país (Zechmeister and Corral (2013)]. …”

Section: El Modelo Y Las Variablesunclassified

Rendición de cuentas en las democracias en desarrollo: El votante latinoamericano

Nadeau

Ratto

Lewis‐Beck

et al. 2015

Rev. cienc. polít. (Santiago)

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“…Thus, the pattern of the data is very irregular. Other measures available are also limited given the number of countries included (Coppedge 1998(Coppedge , 2007 or because they analyze trends of ideological polarization for a single cross-section of countries (Kitschelt and Freeze 2010;Zechmeister and Corral 2013). …”

Section: Models Specificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Entity/Event-Level Sentiment Detection and Inference

Deng

2015

Proceedings of the 2015 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Student Rese

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Turnout has decreased in 23 out of 36 established democracies since 1945. Among all worldwide cases Costa Rica is a good laboratory for studying turnout oscillations. During three decades between 1958 and 1994, political participation average rates remained high in a comparative perspective. Following that trend, one would easily predict that individuals socialized during that period of time must replicate automatically their parents' and grandparents' levels of high political activism. However, turnout patterns in the country since 1998 do not fit very well in that story.Older voters are no longer voting at the rates they usually did and the younger are entering into politics during times of lower participation. The combination of these two factors can have big deleterious and long-lasting effects on turnout trends.Estimating the causal relationship between consecutive voting decisions has proven to be intrinsically difficult for social scientists. Drawing on an exceptionally rich and unique turnout dataset and a mixed-methods approach that includes longitudinal multivariate analysis, face-toface interviews and geospatial statistics this contribution seeks to explain why in Costa Rica, currently the oldest and most stable democracy in Latin America, turnout has declined? And more importantly: what factors drive these changes? v Individual characteristics, although still relevant in static theories regarding turnout determinants, have proved to be insufficient for understanding why individuals' turnout behavior varies over time. Instead, I theorize that the partisan (group) identity that makes people turn out because they are loyal to the party in a context of conflict produces stronger motivation but it is activated selectively, and it only works in a context of "threat" or polarized deliberation.Nevertheless, these incentives may change over time, they may increase or decrease under certain circumstances impacting turnout. Essentially, the more polarized the electoral competition, the easier it will be for citizens to cast their vote.A polarized deliberation, the key factor in my causal story, creates the conditions for the activation of strong partisan identities that stimulate voters' mobilization to the polls. Therefore, During the course of my fieldwork in Costa Rica, I accumulated many debts. I especially thank all the persons I contacted for the interviews and accepted to share their experiences with me. These interviews were crucial for my research project. Without the knowledge I compiled in these conversations I would not be able to develop the theoretical argument of chapter 6.In Pitt, I was also fortunate to share time with several great friends. (Carlin et.al. 2015).The worst case scenario would be one in which this pattern could extend individuals' apathy toward politics during lifetime, causing low turnout to freeze for decades. Therefore, if we want to understand the implications of turnout decline in established democracies, we first need to comprehend the conditions under which these chang...

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Individual and Contextual Constraints on Ideological Labels in Latin America

Cited by 87 publications

References 48 publications

Partisanship, Ideology, and Representation in Latin America

Partisanship, Ideology, and Representation in Latin America

Rendición de cuentas en las democracias en desarrollo: El votante latinoamericano

Entity/Event-Level Sentiment Detection and Inference

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