Indiscernibility and bundles in a structure

Demirli, Sun

doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9420-8

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Having these formal properties, it is more similar to relations like "compresence" or "coinstantiation" that are proposed in metaphysical bundle Downloaded by [RMIT University] at 13:07 14 August 2015 theories of objects. Despite various differences between versions of the bundle theory, the general claim is that entities constituting an object stand to each other in a symmetric but intransitive relation (e.g., Demirli, 2010;Ehring, 2001). By using such a relation, together with the definition of a featurebundle (see [10]), it is possible to resolve the "Many Properties" problem and discern states like (i) and (ii).…”

Section: Feature-bundlesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ontology of early visual content

Skrzypulec

2015

Philosophical Psychology

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The way in which our visual perception presents reality suggests an ontology of the world as composed of objects located in three-dimensional space, which in turn possess various properties and fall into different kinds. Similarly, it is commonly claimed within contemporary philosophy of perception that visual representations present the world as being a certain way (e.g., Schellenberg, 2011;Siegel, 2010). In other words, the content of visual representations specifies objects that have to be present in a visual field if these representations are to be adequate, and so determines a certain "visual ontology. " We may ask for a more precise description of such a "visual ontology" and seek to discover how it is developed through the various stages of the perceptual process. My goal in this article is to provide a sketch of such an ontology, relying on the assumptions of influential scientific models of vision. Because of this, I do not restrict the class of visual representations to conscious perceptual experiences (on which philosophers often focus in discussions regarding content). I instead consider contents of visual representation that are postulated by cognitive, psychological models. I argue that such models contain assumptions concerning objects whose presence is a necessary condition of visual representations' adequacy. The analysis of these assumptions allows us to answer the question of how, according to scientific models of vision, the world would have to be for the representations these models postulate to be adequate.I believe that there are at least two reasons why we should be interested in answering the above question. First, there exist philosophical controversies concerning the ontology of visual content. For example, Russell (1956Russell ( , 2009) endorsed a version of the bundle theory of objects in the context of vision by stating that visual objects can be analyzed as certain combinations of various visual qualities, with special positional qualities among them. Opposed to this view, defenders of "bare substratum" theories claimed that in seeing two objects that are qualitatively the same, we are visually acquainted not only with features and locations but also with irreducible particulars (Allaire, 1963). More recently, Austen Clark (2004) has argued that to present an adequate account of visual content a notion of "visual ABSTRACT The main goal of the paper is to sketch an ontological model of visual content at the low-and medium-level of visual processing, relying on psychological conceptions of vision. It is argued that influential cognitive models contain assumptions concerning "objects of content, " that is, objects whose presence is a necessary condition of the adequacy of visual representations. Subsequently, the structure of considered objects of content is presented, and its development through the perceptual process is described. In addition, during the course of the article I present some connections between analytic metaphysics and the ontology of visual content.

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Section: Feature-bundlesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ontology of early visual content

Skrzypulec

2015

Philosophical Psychology

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“…For early advocates of Bundle Theory, see Russell (1940) andAyer (1954). See O'Leary-Hawthorne (1995), Rodriguez-Pereya (2004), andDemirli (2010) for some of the recent defenders of the theory. I will not discuss in this paper the trope-bundle theory, according to which particulars are bundles of particularized properties called tropes (see Williams 1953 andCampbell 1990).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Otherwise, any two objects would be weakly discernible trivially. 6 See Demirli (2010) and Chappell (1964, p. 63) for advocates of this idea. 7 See, for instance, Ladyman (2005), Saunders (2006), andDemirli (2010).…”

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confidence: 99%

Bundle theory and weak discernibility

Lee

2022

Philosophical Books

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Bundle Theory is the view that every concrete particular object is solely constituted by its universals. This theory is often criticized for not accommodating the possibility of symmetrical universes, such as one that contains two indiscernible spheres two meters from each other in otherwise empty space. One bundle theoretic solution to this criticism holds that the fact that the spheres stand in a weakly discerning—i.e., irreflexive and symmetric—relation, such as being two meters from, is sufficient for the numerical diversity of the spheres. For this solution to be effective, however, it should be established that weak discernibility not only necessitates but also explains numerical diversity. In this paper, I argue that the fact that two objects have a certain distance between them does explain why they are non‐identical. I also argue that the worry that the weak discernibility approach has some circularity problems is not well‐founded.

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“… 4 Note, however, that some recent authors have argued that bundle theories can be dissociated from the claim that things sharing all properties must be identical; see Rodriguez-Pereyra ( 2004 ) and Demirli ( 2010 ). …”

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confidence: 99%

On making a difference: towards a minimally non-trivial version of the identity of indiscernibles

Wörner

2021

Philos Stud

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The identity of indiscernibles (PII) states that indiscernible objects must be identical. Many philosophers have held that the PII turns out to be either true but trivial, or non-trivial but false, depending on how the notion of (in)discernibility is spelled out. In this paper, I propose and defend an account of this notion which aims to yield a minimally non-trivial and yet plausible version of the PII. I argue moreover that this version of the principle is immune to a number of well-known and recent objections to the PII.

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Indiscernibility and bundles in a structure

Cited by 6 publications

References 16 publications

Ontology of early visual content

Ontology of early visual content

Bundle theory and weak discernibility

On making a difference: towards a minimally non-trivial version of the identity of indiscernibles

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