1991
DOI: 10.1093/mind/c.397.53
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Indicative Conditionals Are Truth-Functional

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Cited by 12 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…7 The direct argument plus our assumptions about rational epistemic commitment poses the same problem so long as we have MP. Similarly, Hanson (1991) argues that indicatives must be truth-functional if they satisfy what I am calling here Assumption 2. But his arguments only work in the context of modus ponens and a classical entailment relation.…”
Section: Proofmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…7 The direct argument plus our assumptions about rational epistemic commitment poses the same problem so long as we have MP. Similarly, Hanson (1991) argues that indicatives must be truth-functional if they satisfy what I am calling here Assumption 2. But his arguments only work in the context of modus ponens and a classical entailment relation.…”
Section: Proofmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Not coincidentally, Hanson (1991) shows that while the second line of the truth table for ⊃ comes from M.P. as one might expect, the other three lines can come straight out of conditional proof.…”
Section: Conditional Proofmentioning
confidence: 84%
“…e.g. Hanson 1991). Of course Edgington does not draw that conclusion; we will return to her view below.…”
Section: Problems Fo R the Intensional Analysesmentioning
confidence: 99%