2013
DOI: 10.1007/s10657-013-9432-x
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Independence and accountability of independent regulatory agencies: the case of Turkey

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Cited by 13 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…The bureaucratic apparatus' lack of autonomy vis-à-vis political leadership is a defining trait of the Turkish state's internal structure. 57 This has continued to be the case during the 2000s -within the context of the independent regulatory agencies 58 and the economic bureaucracy. 59 In this respect, the AKP's intervention to key innovation agencies has not only represented a continuum with the past, but also reflected the overall tendency in domains other than STI.…”
Section: The Question Of Bureaucratic Autonomymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The bureaucratic apparatus' lack of autonomy vis-à-vis political leadership is a defining trait of the Turkish state's internal structure. 57 This has continued to be the case during the 2000s -within the context of the independent regulatory agencies 58 and the economic bureaucracy. 59 In this respect, the AKP's intervention to key innovation agencies has not only represented a continuum with the past, but also reflected the overall tendency in domains other than STI.…”
Section: The Question Of Bureaucratic Autonomymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The IFI‐guided reformism of 1999–2002 had emphasized the importance of the IRAs in fostering regulatory capacity in crucial policy domains from banking to energy (Bakır and Öniş, ; Sönmez, ). Yet especially under the AKP's third term, the IRAs have suffered severe formal and informal political interference, which stifles their impartiality and undermines their capacity (Çetin et al., forthcoming; Özel, ). In fact, despite its well‐codified independence, even the Turkish Central Bank has not been immune from government attempts at undue influence.…”
Section: Political Constraints To Policy Changementioning
confidence: 99%
“…This independence is never absolute since, after all, agencies are agents, acting on behalf of a principal (but since agents, they could of course pursue their own agenda, Moe 1990). Independence cannot then be the absence of accountability (see also Çetin et al 2016;Maggetti 2012).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%