Independence after Delegation? Presidential Calculus and Political Interference in Brazilian Regulatory Agencies

Abstract

Is there Executive interference in the regulatory agencies after its formal establishment as independent bodies? Under what conditions the Executive chooses to interfere in the agencies? This paper analyses the degree of interference in Brazilian national regulatory agencies and provide a tentative explanation for the variation in the degree of interference. The basic hypotheses is that credibility costs, the degree of formal independence and the preferences of presidents are crucial factors affecting the extent to which presidents interfere in the regulatory process. A random effects model is estimated with panel data for the period between 1997 and 2008 covering ten national agencies. The degree of interference is operationalized by an index built using factor analysis. The data suggest that there is political interference, which varies across agencies and over time. The results show that the preferences of the president and some issue area specificity matters for the choice that presidents make regarding the interference in the regulatory process.

Regulation and development: Theoretical contributions and empirical lessons from Latin America

“…More recently, González (2022) and González and Gómez‐Álvarez (2022) studied delegation patterns in Latin American countries after the 1990s. They encountered sectoral diffusion patterns by which governments strengthen control, instead of expanding delegation over regulatory agencies (see also Prado, 2017; Silva, 2011). Countries have also introduced accountability measures and the requirement for agencies to use better regulatory practices, as prescribed by the OECD (Perales‐Fernández & Dussauge‐Laguna, 2023).…”