Abstract:This article discusses a unique organization in the regulatory world, the Brazilian Association of Regulatory Agencies (ABAR), which brings together federal, state, and municipal regulatory agencies across different policy sectors. The paper argues that as a regulatory policy network, ABAR has been crucial to the professional socialization, capacity building, and institutionalization of regulators in Brazil. Moreover, it has promoted their identity as professionals and differentiated them from politicians, reg… Show more
“…The socialization mechanisms underpinning regulatory networks are important: regulators exchange information, learn from each other, and eventually become better professionals (Bianculli, 2013;Papadopoulos, 2017). However, mere socialization does not appear to warrant the complexity of NARUC's organizational structure and the multiplicity of its activities.…”
The European Union and the United States are paradigmatic examples of multilevel governance systems that are also regulatory states. In both settings, informal networks of regulators preceded and existed alongside supranational (federal) regulatory agencies. The literature understood their rationale as preparatory to the creation of higher level agencies. This approach, however, cannot explain why informal regulatory networks still exist, years after the establishment of higher level agencies. What explains the persistence of informal regulatory networks? The argument of this article is that in multilevel governance systems, the relationship between regulatory networks and the supranational level of governance is coevolutionary and embodies struggles for autonomy and authority: as the multilevel governance system consolidates, the character of this relationship evolves from collaborative to competitive. The argument relies on a comparative historical analysis of two voluntary networks of energy regulators from the European Union and the United States, based on 27 interviews and archival research.
“…The socialization mechanisms underpinning regulatory networks are important: regulators exchange information, learn from each other, and eventually become better professionals (Bianculli, 2013;Papadopoulos, 2017). However, mere socialization does not appear to warrant the complexity of NARUC's organizational structure and the multiplicity of its activities.…”
The European Union and the United States are paradigmatic examples of multilevel governance systems that are also regulatory states. In both settings, informal networks of regulators preceded and existed alongside supranational (federal) regulatory agencies. The literature understood their rationale as preparatory to the creation of higher level agencies. This approach, however, cannot explain why informal regulatory networks still exist, years after the establishment of higher level agencies. What explains the persistence of informal regulatory networks? The argument of this article is that in multilevel governance systems, the relationship between regulatory networks and the supranational level of governance is coevolutionary and embodies struggles for autonomy and authority: as the multilevel governance system consolidates, the character of this relationship evolves from collaborative to competitive. The argument relies on a comparative historical analysis of two voluntary networks of energy regulators from the European Union and the United States, based on 27 interviews and archival research.
“…Networks have been shown to affect rule adoption across countries (Maggetti and Gilardi 2011;Maggetti and Gilardi 2014) via a process of regulatory coordination at the supranational level. Sociological perspectives have conceptualised networks as arenas where regulators can exchange information, opinions and experiences, and therefore learn from each other (Majone 1997;Humphreys and Simpson 2008;Sabel and Zeitlin 2008;Bianculli 2013). In a policy learning perspective, networked cooperation that is sustained over time enables regulators to experiment with the outcomes of their collaboration, to conceive new approaches to old and new problems (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012).…”
The literature on transnational regulatory networks identified interdependence as their main rationale, downplaying domestic factors. Typically, relevant contributions use the word "network" only metaphorically. Yet, informal ties between regulators constitute networked structures of collaboration, which can be measured and explained. Regulators choose their frequent, regular network partners. What explains those choices? This article develops an Exponential Random Graph Model of the network of European national energy regulators to identify the drivers of informal regulatory networking. The results show that regulators tend to network with peers who regulate similarly organised market structures. Geography and European policy frameworks also play a role. Overall, the British regulator is significantly more active and influential than its peers, and a divide emerges between regulators from EU-15 and others. Therefore, formal frameworks of cooperation (i.e. a European Agency) were probably necessary to foster regulatory coordination across the EU.
“…However, all interviewees gave a positive assessment of MedReg's ability to facilitate the circulation of information and best practices across the network and to affect its members positively via socialization (Bianculli, ). In the words of a regulator from the southern neighbourhood: MedReg has enabled a regional vision […].…”
Section: The Establishment Of Medreg: Network As First Bestmentioning
Regulators often play a leading role in establishing their informal networks yet regulatory networks are usually considered a second-best instrument of policy integration. They have no decision-making powers and unclear policy impact. Why then do regulators initiate networks? The article shows that regulators form networks to shift the venue of policy discussion from a formal setting, dominated by policy-makers, to an informal one, where they share agenda-setting power with their peers only. Regulators forming networks are network entrepreneurs, for whom the establishment of the network is a policy goal in itself. Bolstered by previous positive networking experiences, network entrepreneurs consider networks the best instrument for influencing policy. The article analyses the empirical case of the network of energy regulators of the Euro-Mediterranean (MedReg, established in 2006) using elite interviews with 20 stakeholders. The findings hold implications for our understanding of informal regulatory collaboration in the EU and beyond.
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