Incumbent Advantage, Voter Information and Vote Buying

Abstract

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1. At the Intersection: A Review of Institutions in Economic Development

“…The politicians themselves might also respond in ways that can dampen the effects of negative coverage. For instance, Cruz et al (2015) find evidence that politicians respond to information disclosure by engaging in more vote-buying. They implemented a field experiment in which they provided information to voters in the Philippines about the existence and importance of a large infrastructure public spending programme one week before a municipal election.…”

Field Experiments and Behavioral Theories: Science and Ethics

“…Larreguy et al (2017), for example, showed that an anti-vote-buying campaign in Uganda increased vote buying by opposition candidates, which may explain why treatment reduced support for the incumbent. Cruz, Keefer, and Labonne (2016) showed that Filipino voters given congenial information about challengers' policy priorities still voted for the incumbent because the incumbent targeted them with increased handouts.…”

Campaign externalities, programmatic spending, and voting preferences in rural Mexico: The case of Progresa-Oportunidades-Prospera programme

“…A second generation of studies have adopted both experimental and 'ancillary' approaches to examine the electoral impacts of CCTs. 8 Notable examples are the field experiments by Galiani et al (2017) and Cruz et al (2016) conducted in Honduras and the Philippines, respectively. These studies highlight the role of information asymmetries between incumbents and voters in generating an electoral advantage to the incumbent.…”

“…The literature has also covered questions related to individual voters' income (often referred to as 'pocketbook voting' (Grafstein, 2009;Kramer, 1983); the effects of economic conditions in general, as opposed to partisanship, ideology, or social status (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000), and within that strand, studies that examine whether voting is retrospective or prospective (Fiorina, 1978;Fair, 1996;Healy and Malhotra, 2013;Lockerbie, 1991). Other relevant studies focus on quid pro quo arrangements, including clientelism (Wantchekon, 2003;Stokes, 2005) and the 'incumbency advantage' (Cruz et al , 2016;Mayhew, 2008). 24 The 'paradox of voting' reflects the insight that in large electorates the probability that a single vote is decisive is vanishingly small, and that hence, in the presence of even tiny voting costs, no one should vote (Feddersen, 2004) etc.…”

“…In the particular case of CCTs, there is scant literature that has looked into the electoral effects of these programmes in a number of cases, including Brazil (Zucco, 2013), Colombia (Baez et al , 2012), Honduras (Galiani et al , 2017), Mexico (Cornelius, 2004;Diaz-Cayeros et al , forthcoming;De La O, 2013;Imai et al , 2016;Green, 2005), the Philippines (Cruz et al , 2016), and Uruguay (Manacorda et al , 2011). Overall, this literature reports mixed results, mainly on single elections and mostly under short-term time horizons.…”