Campaign externalities, programmatic spending, and voting preferences in rural Mexico: The case of Progresa-Oportunidades-Prospera programme

Filipovich, Dragan; Niño‐Zarazúa, Miguel; Hernández, Alma Santillán

doi:10.35188/unu-wider/2018/469-8

Cited by 7 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…While weak institutionalization in the provision of social transfers can indeed facilitate clientelistic forms of pro-poor redistribution and offer a double-dividend to political elites because of the reasons discussed in Section , we cannot entirely rule out the possibility of opportunistic regimes in more competitive democratic systems enjoying an incumbency advantage via tactical redistribution, as has been reported from Latin America (De La O 2013;Filipovich et al 2018;Lazar 2004;Luccisano and Macdonald 2012) and Asia (Curato 2017;Hadiz 2016;Jaffrelot and Tillin 2017;Thompson 2016;Wyatt 2013), where large social trans-…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 86%

“…The literature of clientelism has long emphasized the strong association between clientelistic regimes and poverty (Bardhan et al 2010;Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2009;Remmer 2007;Wantchekon 2003). In the particular case of social transfer schemes, a scarce literature highlights the presence of strategic choices that help incumbents maximize the electoral returns on transfer programmes, even under programmatic principles (Filipovich et al 2018).…”

Section: Poverty Targetingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The political economy of social protection adoption

Niño‐Zarazúa¹,

Hernández²

2021

Handbook on Social Protection Systems

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 86%

Section: Poverty Targetingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The political economy of social protection adoption

Niño‐Zarazúa¹,

Hernández²

2021

Handbook on Social Protection Systems

Self Cite

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“…The evidence shows mixed effects. Filipovich et al (2018) found no pro-incumbent effect of the Mexican CCT (Progresa-Oportunidades-Prospera) program on the 2000 and 2012 presidential elections, but registered a significant and negative effect in the 2006 election. There is also evidence that politicians benefit in local elections from the implementation of cash transfers programs (Rodríguez-Chamussy, 2015; Linos, 2013).…”

Section: Section 1: Money and Political Supportmentioning

confidence: 82%

Cash transfers and political support: evidence from Ecuador

Ponce

Curvale

2020

IJDI

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Purpose This paper evaluates the argument that conditional cash transfer program recipients vote for the incumbent. We also test the hypothesis stating that ceasing to receive the benefit hinders support for the incumbent. Design/methodology/approach Using a regression discontinuity design, we assess the impact of the Bono de Desarrollo Humano cash transfer program on pro-incumbent voting of each of these four groups. Findings We did not find a significant impact of the transfer on pro-incumbent vote intention in any of the pairwise comparisons, which suggests that contextual factors determining retrospective voting may play an important role in shaping the relationship between pro-incumbent voting and social policy transfers. Originality/value Drawing on quasi-experimental evidence from Ecuador, where the eligibility criteria of the program changed exogenously, we evaluate the impacts of several treatments on pro-incumbent voting. We are able to identify four distinct groups: recipients under both eligibility criteria, nonrecipients under both criteria, new recipients and new nonrecipients.

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“…More competitive political systems have also meant that political incentives for the opportunistic incumbent to manipulate spending on social assistance have been salient across the Global South (Block ). Thus, rigorous targeting mechanisms have been increasingly adopted to constrain political clientelism, although with limited success (Filipovich, Niño‐Zarazúa, and Santillán‐Hernández ; Rawlings and Rubio ; Sewall ).…”

Section: Welfare and Redistribution In Social Assistancementioning

confidence: 99%

Welfare and Redistributive Effects of Social Assistance in the Global South

Niño‐Zarazúa¹

2019

Population & Development Rev

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This paper presents an analysis of the recent evolution of social assistance in the developing world, looking at its complex typological configuration, which has interlinked with, and partly reflects the complex demographic and epidemiological transitions and rapid urbanization and economic convergence that many developing countries have exhibited over the past decades. The paper underscores the principles of the poverty focus of social assistance and presents an overview of existence evidence of first‐ and second‐order effects of social assistance, particularly in the domains of poverty, education, health, and labor markets. Moreover, the paper highlights the knowledge gaps with regard to the longer term and gender‐specific welfare effects of social assistance, and the redistributive effects, and the incentives and distortion mechanisms that transfer programs can generate in the labor and insurance markets.

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Campaign externalities, programmatic spending, and voting preferences in rural Mexico: The case of Progresa-Oportunidades-Prospera programme

Abstract: This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on 'The political economy of social protection systems', which is part of a larger research project on 'The economics and politics of taxation and social protection'.

Cited by 7 publications

References 94 publications

The political economy of social protection adoption

The political economy of social protection adoption

Cash transfers and political support: evidence from Ecuador

Welfare and Redistributive Effects of Social Assistance in the Global South

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