Incommensurability and Theory Change

Abstract

Relativism emerged as a significant issue in the philosophy of science as a result of the historical turn that took place in the field in the 1960s. Influenced by historical studies of science, philosophers came to see the process of scientific theory change as crucial to the understanding of science itself. Rather than focus on static relations between theory and evidence, proponents of the historical turn emphasized the profound transformations which accompany theory change. The transformations are not restricted to mere change in what theories say about the world. They extend to the method and practice of science, alter the conceptual and semantic apparatus of theories, and affect the content of scientists' perceptual experience. But in the absence of fixed elements capable of playing a neutral role in the context of theory change, it is unclear how choice between competing theories may be made on an objective basis. Because of this a relativistic account of scientific theory choice may seem to be the inevitable consequence of the historical turn in the philosophy of science. Among the most influential advocates of the historical approach to the philosophy of science were Paul Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn, both of whom emphasized the far-reaching implications of scientific theory change. In separate publications originally published in 1962, Feyerabend and Kuhn independently proposed the thesis that successive or competing theories may be

Incommensurability, Relativism, and the Epistemic Authority of Science

“…7 The move from an Aristotelian physics to an inertial physics would presumably be understood in the same way, in which case, Galileo's argument against Bellarmine rests strictly on considerations of expedience. 5 For alternative responses to the arguments from semantic and methodological incommensurability, see Sankey (2011) and (2013). For a criticism of Sankey's response to methodological incommensurability, see Bland (2013).…”

“… 1 This distinction was first made in the Introduction to Hoyningen-Huene and Sankey (2001). See also Bird (2011) and Sankey (2011). There are other types of incommensurability that can be distinguished from these two, such as ontological incommensurability – ‘... the proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds’ (Kuhn 1996: 150) – but the doctrines of semantic and methodological incommensurability will be the focus of this paper. …”

“… 5 For alternative responses to the arguments from semantic and methodological incommensurability, see Sankey (2011) and (2013). For a criticism of Sankey's response to methodological incommensurability, see Bland (2013).…”

Relativism in Feyerabend's later writings

“…Moreover, and second, I shall say nothing on the thorny topic of incommensurability. This part of Feyerabend's oeuvre has recently been investigated in considerable depth by several scholars, and I have little to add to their results (Hoyningen-Huene 2000, Oberheim 2007, Preston 1997, Sankey 2011.…”

Relativismo sin esquemas conceptuales

“…Por un lado, se intenta defender que hay una diferencia radical entre interpretación y traducción y, por otro, que los procesos de traducción tipo Davidson, los cuales son de naturaleza extensional, son incapaces de captar las nociones intensionales que, se supone, son las nociones relevantes para hablar de inconmensurabilidad (cf. Feyerabend;Kuhn 2002: Sankey 1999, 2011. De esta manera, los relativistas creen salvar la noción de inconmensurabilidad e intraducibilidad parcial que sirve como base para sostener que hay esquemas conceptuales alternativos.…”