Relativism in Feyerabend's later writings

Kusch, Martin

doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.11.010

Cited by 18 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…"Symmetry" is, first and foremost, the requirement to treat ES symmetrically. "Symmetry" can be construed in many different ways, and "equal validity" is only one of them (Kusch 2016;Ashton 2020). Critics of ER often argue that ER entails the belief that all possible epistemic systems (ES) are equally good.…”

Section: Renouncing the Renunciation Of Judgmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To combine both ER and SP in one's position, certain VEPPs need to be sufficiently similar. Paul Feyerabend's early and late epistemological anarchism is an example of a position that admits both SP and ER (Kusch 2016). There are also more recent examples.…”

Section: Stances: Relativism and Pluralism Reconsideredmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is not the case for the ER literature. Several articles consider plurality or pluralism a component of ER (Boghossian 2007;Kusch 2016;Carter 2017). The idea, however, that SP does not entail ER because ER renounces judgment has not directly been addressed in the ER literature.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Notes on a complicated relationship: scientific pluralism, epistemic relativism, and stances

Veigl

2020

Synthese

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While scientific pluralism enjoys widespread popularity within the philosophy of science, a related position, epistemic relativism, does not have much traction. Defenders of scientific pluralism, however, dread the question of whether scientific pluralism entails epistemic relativism. It is often argued that if a scientific pluralist accepts epistemic relativism, she will be unable to pass judgment because she believes that “anything goes”. In this article, I will show this concern to be unnecessary. I will also argue that common strategies to differentiate relativism and pluralism fail. Building upon this analysis, I will propose a new way of looking at both positions’ relations. This article aims to understand what explains the friction between scientific pluralism and epistemic relativism. I will demonstrate that conceptualizing both epistemic relativism and scientific pluralism as “stances” sheds better light on their relation and demonstrates that it is, in principle, possible to support both positions at the same time. Preferred policies and levels of analysis, however, cause friction in practice.

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Section: Renouncing the Renunciation Of Judgmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Stances: Relativism and Pluralism Reconsideredmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Notes on a complicated relationship: scientific pluralism, epistemic relativism, and stances

Veigl

2020

Synthese

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“…I look beyond these two books only where ES's discussion of Feyerabend's views draws on texts other than AM, and where van Fraassen further develops important claims of ES. I have already elsewhere discussed Feyerabend's relativism in his later writings (Kusch 2016). Moreover, Feyerabend's and van Fraassen's respective oeuvres are of such breadth, depth, and development over time, that a full consideration of all of their important similarities and differences would require a book-length treatment.…”

Section: §1 Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemological Anarchism Meets Epistemic Voluntarism

Kusch¹

2021

Interpreting Feyerabend

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“…For interpretations of Feyerabend's later philosophy, seePreston (1998),Farrell (2001),Kidd (2012),Kidd (2016),Tambolo (2014),Martin (2016),Heller (2016),Sorgner (2016),Kusch (2016),Brown (2016) andShaw (2017).32 This thread has been highlighted byFarrell (2003, p. 150) under the heading of "axiological normativity" and expanded into a perspicuous account of Feyerabend's overall philosophy in the same book.33 Kuby (in preparation) offers a critique of Feyerabend's conception of "partisan" historiography he defended against Kuhn.34 How far reaching Feyerabend thinks these interrelations are, is well exemplified by his remark that the "choice of the critical form of life will have repercussions in very distant fields, for example, in the dramatic arts"(Feyerabend 1962, p. 71).…”

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confidence: 99%

Decision-Based Epistemology: sketching a systematic framework of Feyerabend’s metaphilosophy

Kuby

2020

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In this paper I defend the claim that Paul Feyerabend held a robust metaphilosophical position for most of his philosophical career. This position I call Decision-Based Epistemology and reconstruct it in terms of three key components: (1) a form of epistemic voluntarism concerning the justification of philosophical positions and (2) a behaviorist account of philosophical beliefs, which allows him (3) to cast normative arguments concerning philosophical beliefs in scientific methodology, such as realism, in terms of means-ends relations. I then introduce non-naturalist and naturalist variants of his conception of normativity, which I trace back to his mentors Viktor Kraft and Karl Popper, respectively. This distinction, introduced on the metaphilosophical level, can can be put to use to explain key changes in Feyerabend’s philosophical proposals, such as the viability of his methodological argument for realism. I conclude that this Decision-Based Epistemology should be further explored by historically embedding Feyerabend’s metaphilosophy in a voluntarist tradition of scientific philosophy.

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Relativism in Feyerabend's later writings

Cited by 18 publications

References 15 publications

Notes on a complicated relationship: scientific pluralism, epistemic relativism, and stances

Notes on a complicated relationship: scientific pluralism, epistemic relativism, and stances

Epistemological Anarchism Meets Epistemic Voluntarism

Decision-Based Epistemology: sketching a systematic framework of Feyerabend’s metaphilosophy

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