Incentivizing Information Design

Rappoport, Daniel; Somma, Valentin

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3001416

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 17 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…A subclass of these are those papers that study the contracting problem of paying an agent to acquire information. Rappoport and Somma (2017) study the problem of inducing an agent to acquire hard evidence; and Yoder (2022) studies the impact of private information in this setting, introducing a screening element. Sharma et al (2020) asks how to impel a risk-neutral agent to acquire and report honestly soft information in a two-state environment; 2 and Whitmeyer and Zhang (2022) study the general problem of "buying opinions," allowing for an arbitrary number of states and risk aversion.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Redeeming Falsifiability?

Whitmeyer¹,

Zhang²

2023

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Redeeming Falsifiability?

Whitmeyer¹,

Zhang²

2023

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This measure features the uniform posterior separability (UPS) property introduced by Caplin and Dean (2013). The property generalizes mutual information and is widely used in applications (Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014), Clark and Reggiani (2021), Matyskova (2018), Rappoport and Somma (2017)). Several foundations have been provided for UPS (Caplin, Dean, and Leahy (2017), Morris and Strack (2019), Frankel and Kamenica (2019)).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Dynamic Information Acquisition

Zhong

2022

ECTA

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I study a dynamic model in which a decision‐maker (DM) acquires information about the payoffs of different alternatives prior to making a decision. The model's key feature is the flexibility of information: the DM can choose any dynamic signal process as an information source, subject to a flow cost that depends on the informativeness of the signal. Under the optimal policy, the DM acquires a signal that arrives according to a Poisson process. The optimal Poisson signal confirms the DM's prior belief and is sufficiently precise to warrant immediate action. Over time, given the absence of the arrival of a Poisson signal, the DM continues seeking an increasingly precise but less frequent Poisson signal.

show abstract

“…There are quite a few papers analyzing the contracting problem when the ex post realized state is contractible, e.g., Osband (1989), Zermeño (2011), Rappoport and Somma (2015), Carroll (2017), Clark (2017), and Häfner and Taylor (2018), among others. Since there is no need to hire multiple experts to generate incentives, these papers all consider a single expert.…”

Section: Cost Of Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Monitoring experts

Azrieli

2021

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study the design of contracts that incentivize experts to collect information and truthfully report it to a decision maker. We depart from most of the previous literature by assuming that the transfers cannot depend on the realized state or on the ex post payoff of the decision maker. The contract thus has to induce the experts to “monitor each other” by making the transfers contingent on the entire vector of reports. We characterize the least costly contract that implements any given vector of efforts and derive the cost function for the decision maker. We then study properties of optimal contracts by comparing the value of information and its cost.

show abstract

Incentivizing Information Design

Cited by 6 publications

References 17 publications

Redeeming Falsifiability?

Redeeming Falsifiability?

Optimal Dynamic Information Acquisition

Monitoring experts

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About