Infamously, the presence of honest communication in a signaling environment may be di cult to reconcile with small (relative) signaling costs or a low degree of common interest between sender (bene ciary) and receiver (donor). This paper posits that one mechanism through which such communication can arise is through inattention on the part of the receiver, which allows for honest communication in settings where-should the receiver be fully attentive-honest communication would be impossible. We explore this idea through the Sir Philip Sidney game in detail and show that some degree of inattention is always weakly better for the receiver and may be strictly better. We compare limited attention to Lachmann and Bergstrom's (1998) notion of a signaling medium and show that the receiver-optimal degree of inattention is equivalent to the receiver-optimal choice of medium.
Infamously, the presence of honest communication in a signaling environment may be difficult to reconcile with small signaling costs or a low degree of common interest between sender and receiver. This paper posits that one mechanism through which such communication can arise is through inattention on the part of the receiver, which allows for honest communication in settings where, should the receiver be fully attentive, honest communication would be impossible. We explore this idea through the Sir Philip Sidney game in detail and show that some degree of inattention is always weakly better for the receiver, and may be strictly better. Moreover, some inattention may be a Pareto improvement and leave the sender no worse off. We compare limited attention to notion of a signaling medium and show that the receiver-optimal degree of inattention is equivalent to the receiver-optimal choice of medium.the sender and the receiver-under any vector of strategies each player receives k times the payoff of the other player plus his or her own payoff.The purpose of this paper is to explore strategic inattention in this setting. That is, in recent work, Whitmeyer (2019) [15] highlights that full transparency is not generally optimal for the receiver in signaling games, and takes steps to characterize the receiveroptimal degree of transparency in those games. In particular, less than full transparency may beget informative equilibria in situations where there is little to no meaningful communication under full transparency. 1
Given a purely atomic probability measure with support on n points, P , any meanpreserving contraction of P , Q, with support on m > n points is a mixture of mean-preserving contractions of P , each with support on most n points. We illustrate an application of this result towards competitive Bayesian persuasion.
We consider a two player simultaneous-move game where the two players each select any permissible n-sided die for a fixed integer n. A player wins if the outcome of his roll is greater than that of his opponent. Remarkably, for n > 3, there is a unique Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. The unique Nash Equilibrium is for each player to throw the Standard n-sided die, where each side has a different number. Our proof of uniqueness is constructive. We introduce an algorithm with which, for any nonstandard die, we may generate another die that beats it.
This paper formulates the classic Monty Hall problem as a Bayesian game. Allowing Monty a small amount of freedom in his decisions facilitates a variety of solutions. The solution concept used is the Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE), and the set of BNE relies on Monty's motives and incentives. We endow Monty and the contestant with common prior probabilities (p) about the motives of Monty and show that, under certain conditions on p, the unique equilibrium is one in which the contestant is indifferent between switching and not switching. This coincides and agrees with the typical responses and explanations by experimental subjects. In particular, we show that our formulation can explain the experimental results in Page (1998), that more people gradually choose switch as the number of doors in the problem increases.
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