Incentives, Entrepreneurs, and Boundary Change

Abstract

The authors develop an institutional choice framework to examine and interpret change in local boundaries and provide a single explanation for the use of varied instruments to create new boundaries or expand old ones. Boundary decisions are viewed as the product of actors' seeking particular outcomes within a context of existing governments and established rules governing boundary change. Selective costs and benefits, rather than collective costs and benefits, are most likely to provide incentives for institutional entrepreneurship and collective action. Such a framework is valuable because it integrates the fragmented literatures on local boundaries, provides a linkage between boundary choices and policy outcomes at the local level, and can guide empirical research into the causes and consequences of boundary change. This framework can provide the foundation of a more general model of institutional choice and institutional entrepreneurship.

Institutional Collective Action, Social Capital and Regional Development Partnership

“…11,No. 2 there are powerful incentives for parties in this situation to defect-to abandon agreements to cooperate and instead pursue individual interests (Feiock, 2001). Transaction costs are a barrier to contracting or collective action even where agreements for cooperative action would be mutually advantageous.…”

“…Collaboration though functional consolidations provide a decentralized regionalism comprised of networks of horizontal agreements, as well as functionally and geographically defined overlays of nested service units Oakerson, 1989, Feiock andCarr, 2001;Thurmaier & Wood, 2004;Oakerson, 2004).…”

The Economic Development Strategy Preferences of Community Leaders in Texas

“…It is based on the idea that negative externalities arise because of a spatial mismatch between the most significant policy problems faced by a community and the resources needed to address them (Ihlanfeldt, 1995). To address and eliminate the mismatch between problems and resources, regionalism advances the idea that government institutions be created to reallocate resources to address existing problems and that all communities tie themselves to a central governing institution (Feiock & Carr, 2001). Joining a common governing institution demonstrates a community's willingness to adopt a regional approach to problem solving as well as its commitment to a regional governance policy-making approach that relies on cooperation and coordination among participant community governments rather than government coercion (Feiock & Carr, 2001).…”

“…To address and eliminate the mismatch between problems and resources, regionalism advances the idea that government institutions be created to reallocate resources to address existing problems and that all communities tie themselves to a central governing institution (Feiock & Carr, 2001). Joining a common governing institution demonstrates a community's willingness to adopt a regional approach to problem solving as well as its commitment to a regional governance policy-making approach that relies on cooperation and coordination among participant community governments rather than government coercion (Feiock & Carr, 2001). The primary drawback to a regionalist approach to governance is that member communities surrender a significant amount of latitude and autonomy over pursuing their policy goals and objectives.…”

Grandir en une nuit : le discret redécoupage des municipalités allemandes

“…Les réformes territoriales et les redécoupages municipaux : le coup de ciseau politique 5 Les transformations des découpages municipaux sont une branche souvent négligée des boundaries studies, traitant en particulier des questions de contrôle politique du territoire (Feiock et Carr, 2001 ;Rice et al, 2014), même si cette approche est loin d'être dominante dans la littérature concernant le cas allemand.…”