Incentive regulation and telco performance: A primer

Telecommunications liberalization and regulatory governance: lessons from Latin America

“…So more complicated (simultaneous, lagged) models need to be specified and tested (Berg and Foreman 1996). Nevertheless, this initial study sheds new light on the determinants of telecommunications investment in the region.…”

“…Specifically, , Donald and Sappington (1995), and Donald and Sappington (1997) found that incentive regulation like price-cap regulation tends to have a bigger impact on investment in telecommunications than rate-of-return regulation. However, as Berg and Foreman (1996) and Kridel et al (1996) warn, the links between the regulatory regime and telco performance are complex, so studies need to avoid pitfalls and must be carefully interpreted. Lack of reliable data also limits the chance of including pricing regimes as determinants of either network deployment or productivity for our sample of Latin American countries.…”

Regulatory governance in the Latin American telecommunications sector

“…This is a second-generation effort to construct a useful index, and the research remains only a beginning step toward a more integrated 15 See the survey by Kridel et al (1996) and Berg and Foreman (1996). A more detailed and thorough analysis of incentive regulation in U.S. telecommunications is given in Sappington and Weissman (1996).…”

A coupled two-sheath simulation of RF bias at high electronegativities

“…To span the entire continuum, a piecewise uniform grid is employed. Parallel processing through multi-threaded programming [22] was performed on an E6000 TM † multi-processor machine to handle multiple sheaths and ionic species. The ionic densities and potentials share the same grid which is staggered half a time step ahead of the velocity grid (see figure 2).…”