Incentive Contracts for Natura 2000 Implementation in Forest Areas

Anthon, Signe; Garcia, Serge; Stenger, Anne

doi:10.1007/s10640-009-9341-1

Cited by 25 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Where monitoring is imperfect, input regulation and cost-sharing or taxation may dominate performance regulation. Anthon et al (2010) consider the optimal design of PES-type contracts to private landowners under asymmetric information. They find foresters who are likely to achieve a higher level of conservation should be offered outputbased contracts.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Should We Pay for Ecosystem Service Outputs, Inputs or Both?

White

Hanley

2016

Environ Resource Econ

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Should We Pay for Ecosystem Service Outputs, Inputs or Both?

White

Hanley

2016

Environ Resource Econ

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“…Hence, the ability or the opportunity costs of producing environmental outputs may greatly vary from one forest owner to another (e.g., Vedel et al 2015). In some environmental regulation models such as the one described in the article of Anthon et al (2010), it is considered that the probability of achieving a targeted ecological level differs among forest owners. Due to the variability and complexity of biological systems, the relationship between the conservation actions and the outcome is subject to uncertainty.…”

Section: Spatial Heterogeneitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, the use of voluntary contracts offers a number of advantages. As highlighted by Anthon et al (2010), it is generally more acceptable to the landowners who become producers of public goods. It is also more flexible than one-size-fits-all laws since it allows for differentiation between habitats and owner types, thereby increasing production of biodiversity where benefits are the greatest and/or costs are minimised.…”

Section: Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Examples range from early programmes in Costa Rica (Porras et al 2013) and Vietnam (Pham et al 2013) to PES experiences in EU countries, such as (forest) Natura 2000 contracts in France (Anthon et al 2010;Hily et al 2015). PESs are subsidies for the producers of these services for the purpose of internalising positive externalities.…”

Section: Payments and Incentive Mechanisms For Ecosystem Servicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Under this incentive scheme, the government is able to identify ex post how much additional forest each landowner contributes. Moreover, an example of the deadweight effect incurred by asymmetric information is given by Anthon et al (2010) who describe a Natura 2000 contract in which the forest owner is committed to opening passageways for bats. Modification and maintenance work is 100% financed over 5 years.…”

Section: Payments and Incentive Mechanisms For Ecosystem Servicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How does economic research contribute to the management of forest ecosystem services?

Garcia

Abildtrup

Stenger

2018

Annals of Forest Science

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& Key message More and more environmental and resource economists are taking a particular interest in research on forest ecosystem services (FES), especially in a context of climate change. Spatial and temporal issues are crucial to economic analyses and for the design of conservation policies. Interdisciplinary research involving ecological and economic disciplines is a prerequisite for the more effective management of forest ecosystems. & Context Economists define non-market ecosystem services (ES) as public or common goods due to their characteristics of non-rivalry in terms of consumption and/or non-excludability. Just because they do not have a price does not mean that ES have no economic value because their social benefits are undoubtedly considerable. These features, associated with the market demand for timber and a poor climate risk assessment, may lead to the under-provision of non-market forest ES and the over-harvesting of timber. & Aims In this article, we review research questions that are central to the enhancement of FES provision. Beyond the economic modelling of the joint provision of FES, we focus on issues related to the design of public policies to guide forest management. The objective is to provide crucial insights concerning the importance of a spatial and sustainable provision of FES. & Results First, we provide an economic interpretation of the FES concept and a review of economic models of forest management. Second, we explain how spatial and temporal dimensions of FES can have major implications on their supply and demand. Both dimensions explain why FESs have to be taken into account in production decisions and public policies (including the design of payment for environmental services (PESs)). & Conclusion A better understanding of FES provision and public policies to be enhanced is not possible without accounting for spatial and temporal dimensions. This helps to analyse the impact of intervention on FES and the cost-effectiveness of economic instruments, implying a coordinated effort to bring together ecological and economic data and models.

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Improving the Policy Mix: The Scope for Market‐Based Instruments in EU Biodiversity Policy

Klassert

Möckel

2013

Env Pol Gov

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The European Union (EU) is still lagging behind its objective to halt the loss of biodiversity. Current research shows promising ways to improve the cost‐effectiveness of existing policy mixes for habitat protection through the introduction of market‐based instruments. To harness the potential of these ideas for the pursuit of the EU's biodiversity conservation objective during upcoming changes in the policy landscape and to identify the optimal allocation for each instrument, it is necessary to understand the scope for the introduction of market‐based instruments across all relevant fields of EU policymaking. So far, there are, however, few systematic analyses satisfying this purpose. This article analyzes existing instruments under the Birds and the Habitats Directives and the Common Agricultural Policy, and the de lege and de facto constraints and opportunities that result from these policies for the introduction of additional market‐based instruments. The analysis shows that the distribution of authority between the EU and its member states gives each of them different comparative advantages for the introduction of market‐based instruments in the different policy fields. These provide various opportunities for the improvement of the existing policy mix for habitat protection. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

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Incentive Contracts for Natura 2000 Implementation in Forest Areas

Abstract: Adverse selection, Conservation contracts, Forest, Incentives, Limited liability, Moral hazard, Natura 2000, Uncertain outcome, D82, Q23, Q57,

Cited by 25 publications

References 21 publications

Should We Pay for Ecosystem Service Outputs, Inputs or Both?

Should We Pay for Ecosystem Service Outputs, Inputs or Both?

How does economic research contribute to the management of forest ecosystem services?

Improving the Policy Mix: The Scope for Market‐Based Instruments in EU Biodiversity Policy

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