Incentive based scheme for improving data availability in vehicular ad-hoc networks

Dubey, Brij Bihari; Chauhan, Naveen; Chand, Narottam; Awasthi, Lalit Kumar

doi:10.1007/s11276-016-1246-7

Cited by 12 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…Whether in communication technology or practical applications, the success of VANETs needs the message transmission incentive mechanism to ensure the effective transmission of messages. The incentive mechanisms of message transmission in VANETs can be divided into four aspects: reward-based [24], reputation-based [25][26][27][28], punishmentbased [29], and mobile-social-network-based [30][31][32].…”

Section: Incentive Mechanism Of Vanetsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation Promotion from the Perspective of Behavioral Economics: An Incentive Mechanism Based on Loss Aversion in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks

Liu

Huang

et al. 2021

Electronics

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As a special mobile ad-hoc network, Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) have the characteristics of high-speed movement, frequent topology changes, multi-hop routing, a lack of energy, storage space limitations, and the possible selfishness of the nodes. These characteristics bring challenges to the design of the incentive mechanism in VANETs. In the current research on the incentive mechanism of VANETs, the mainstream is the reward-based incentive mechanism. Most of these mechanisms are designed based on the expected utility theory of traditional economics and assume that the positive and negative effects produced by an equal amount of gain and loss are equal in absolute value. However, the theory of loss aversion points out that the above effects are not equal. Moreover, this will lead to a deviation between the final decision-making behavior of nodes and the actual optimal situation. Therefore, this paper proposed a Loss-Aversion-based Incentive Mechanism (LAIM) to promote the comprehensive perception and sharing of information in the VANETs. This paper designs the incentive threshold and the threshold factor to motivate vehicle nodes to cooperate. Furthermore, based on the number of messages that the nodes face, the utility function of nodes is redesigned to correct the assumption that a gain and a loss of an equal amount could offset each other in traditional economics. The simulation results show that compared with the traditional incentive mechanism, the LAIM can increase the average utility of nodes by more than 34.35%, which promotes the cooperation of nodes.

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Section: Incentive Mechanism Of Vanetsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation Promotion from the Perspective of Behavioral Economics: An Incentive Mechanism Based on Loss Aversion in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks

Liu

Huang

et al. 2021

Electronics

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“…Many researchers have addressed the issue of selfishness in it. The selfish behavior of the nodes degrades the performance of the network 27,28 . Incentive‐based mechanisms encourage the selfish nodes to simulate and share its resources for cooperation in the network 29 .…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Honesty based democratic scheme to improve community cooperation for Internet of Things based vehicular delay tolerant networks

Rehman

Ghani

Zubair

et al. 2020

Trans Emerging Tel Tech

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Many Internet of Things (IoT) applications have been developed and implemented on unreliable wireless networks like the delay tolerant network (DTN); however, efficient data transfer in DTN is still an important issue for the IoT applications. One of the application areas of DTN is vehicular delay tolerant network (VDTN) where the network faces communication disruption due to lack of end‐to‐end relay route. It is challenging as some of the nodes show selfish behavior to preserve their resources like memory and energy and become noncooperative. In this article, an honesty‐based democratic scheme (HBDS) is introduced where vehicles with higher honesty level are elected as heads—during the process. Vehicles involved in the process would maximize their rewards (reputation) through active participation in the network activities, whereas vehicles with noncooperative selfish behavior are punished. The honesty level of the heads is analyzed using Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves (VCG) model. The mathematical model and algorithms developed in the proposed HBDS technique are simulated using the VDTNSim framework to evaluate their efficiency. The performance results show that the proposed scheme dominates current schemes in terms of packet delivery probability, packet delivery delay, number of packets drop, and overhead ratio.

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“…In this mechanism, trusted nodes receive rewards in the cluster, which is related to the consumption of participation. A Rewards and Bounds-based cooperation transmission mechanism named RBI was proposed in Reference [ 20 ], which constructs a forwarding tree from the source node to the destination node. RBI provides rewards to nodes which participate in message transmission based on their effort degree.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The above-mentioned incentive-based and reputation-based mechanisms are mostly based on the expected utility theory of traditional economics, such as mechanisms proposed in Reference [ 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 ]. Those mechanisms assumed that nodes are independent of each other and each decision behavior of a node depends on the utility value itself and does not affected by the decision motivation of other nodes.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

BMCGM: A Behavior Economics-Based Message Transmission Cooperation Guarantee Mechanism in Vehicular Ad-hoc NETworks

Liu

Zhong

et al. 2018

Sensors

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Vehicular Ad-hoc NETwork (VANET) is a special mobile ad hoc network that composed of facilities such as vehicle nodes and roadside units. Message transfer among vehicle nodes has been a great challenge due to the network’s highly variable topology and the selfish nature of vehicle nodes. Thus, it is very necessary to propose a mechanism to improve the cooperation among vehicle nodes to guarantee the effective message transmission. Currently, incentive-based cooperation mechanisms are commonly used to encourage nodes to participate in message transmission. Those mechanisms are based on traditional economics and generally assume that the decision-making behavior of nodes is completely independent. Also, the cooperation of nodes depends on whether the cooperation behavior can obtain the higher utility. But researches in behavioral economics have shown that due to the existence of altruistic reciprocity, the behavior of nodes is affected by not only their utility but also the behavioral motives of other nodes, so as to obtain different results from traditional incentive-based mechanisms. Therefore, the paper introduces the reciprocal altruistic from behavioral economics and proposes the reciprocal altruistic factor to reconstruct the utility function of nodes. The reconstructed utility function reflects the interaction of behavioral motives among nodes, which promotes the node’s cooperative behavior. Also, since the Network Formation Game (NFG) is a common mathematical model for studying the interaction and communication links formation among network nodes, hence the paper regards NFG in traditional economics as the research object. A Behavior Economics-based Message Transmission Cooperation Guarantee Mechanism named BMCGM is proposed, which motivates nodes to participate in the message transmission to reduce the transmission delay ratio. The simulation results show that the BMCGM reduces message transmission delay by at least 30.3% compared with the recent representative cooperation transmission mechanism.

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Incentive based scheme for improving data availability in vehicular ad-hoc networks

Cited by 12 publications

References 45 publications

Cooperation Promotion from the Perspective of Behavioral Economics: An Incentive Mechanism Based on Loss Aversion in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks

Cooperation Promotion from the Perspective of Behavioral Economics: An Incentive Mechanism Based on Loss Aversion in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks

Honesty based democratic scheme to improve community cooperation for Internet of Things based vehicular delay tolerant networks

BMCGM: A Behavior Economics-Based Message Transmission Cooperation Guarantee Mechanism in Vehicular Ad-hoc NETworks

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