In support of “no-fault” civil liability rules for artificial intelligence

Abstract

Civil liability is traditionally understood as indirect market regulation, since the risk of incurring liability for damages gives incentives to invest in safety. Such an approach, however, is inappropriate in the markets of artificial intelligence devices. In fact, according to the current paradigm of civil liability, compensation is allowed only to the extent that “someone” is identified as a debtor. However, in many cases it would not be useful to impose the obligation to pay such compensation to producers and programmers: the algorithms, in fact, can “behave” far independently from the instructions initially provided by programmers so that they can err despite no flaw in design or implementation. Therefore, application of “traditional” civil liability to AI may represent a disincentive to new technologies based on artificial intelligence. This is why I think artificial intelligence requires that the law evolves, on this matter, from an issue of civil liability into one of financial management of losses. No-fault redress schemes could be an interesting and worthy regulatory strategy in order to enable this evolution. Of course, such schemes should apply only in cases where there is no evidence that producers and programmers have acted under conditions of negligence, imprudence or unskillfulness and their activity is adequately compliant with scientifically validated standards.

Liability for harm caused by AI in healthcare: an overview of the core legal concepts

“…Generally, fault-based liability is based on a person's intentional or negligent conduct which causes harm wrongfully and culpably (Mukheibir et al, 2010). Liability is attributed based on a determination of who should justly compensate for the damages of the plaintiff (Marchisio, 2021). Currently, there is no case law to guide the application of fault-based liability principles, particularly in cases where the AI suffers from an unknown flaw which was not reasonably foreseeable (Donnelly, 2022).…”

To find fault is easy, to find no-fault is fair

“…Hence, assuming that CDSS software developers themselves are unlikely to be proven negligent, the expansion of AI could well drive the evolution of civil liability law towards a new system that focuses, more straightforwardly and achievably, on the financial management of losses -ie, nofault. 29,30…”

La Función Preventiva De Los Daños Causados Por La Robótica Y Los Sistemas Autónomos

“…Ante un grado mayor de autonomía, mayor será la probabilidad de que las acciones o decisiones de los RSA se tornen imprevisibles o azarosos para sus diseñadores, fabricantes, propietarios y operadores. 8 En ese sentido, es probable que en el futuro los RSA se comporten con mayor autonomía en base a la evolución tecnológica (MARCHISIO, 2021).…”

“…Según el análisis económico del Derecho, el objetivo central del Derecho de la responsabilidad civil es reducir al mínimo el coste de los accidentes, es decir, la suma total de los recursos empleados en prevenir y resarcir los perjuicios (DÍEZ-PICAZO, 1999). Así, la responsabilidad civil puede entenderse como una regulación indirecta del mercado ya que el riesgo de incurrir en responsabilidad por daños proporciona un incentivo para invertir en seguridad (MARCHISIO, 2021). En cambio, el método de mercado dejaría que el nivel de actividades y accidentes se determinara enteramente por las decisiones individuales del mercado.…”