In Self-Defence

Foster, John F.

doi:10.1007/978-1-349-04862-5_8

Cited by 18 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…4). Perhaps the most prominent contemporary extensionalists are Foster (1979) and Dainton (2006), each of whom can be seen to subscribe to a version of the relational view, as I will explain below (see footnote 12). If one took the view that the initial characterizations I gave in the above paragraph in fact already provide sufficient definitions of intentionalism and extensionalism, it would come as a surprise to find intentionalism lining up with a representational view, and extensionalism with a relational view, in this manner in the literature.…”

Section: Two Views Of (Temporal) Experiencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…On a more liberal understanding, though, the relational view might actually be seen to be neutral between realism, thus understood, and views that hold that the only items to which we stand in the relevant relation of awareness of acquaintance are mental entities. It is interesting to note in this context that, of the most prominent recent advocates of extensionalism, one holds a type of idealism inspired by Berkeley (Foster 1979), and the other adopts a Lockean-type indirect realism he calls 'projectivism' (Dainton 2006). Both of these approaches in fact also involve variants of a relational view, as characterised above, in so far as they analyse experience, most fundamentally, as a matter of awareness of or acquaintance with certain types of items-albeit, in this case, mental ones-rather than as a matter of representation.…”

Section: Two Views Of (Temporal) Experiencementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

'A Succession of Feelings, in and of Itself, is Not a Feeling of Succession'

Hoerl¹

2013

Mind

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Section: Two Views Of (Temporal) Experiencementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Two Views Of (Temporal) Experiencementioning

confidence: 99%

'A Succession of Feelings, in and of Itself, is Not a Feeling of Succession'

Hoerl¹

2013

Mind

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“…James designates the time that belongs to the individual act of perception, following E. R. Clay, as the "specious present," the apparent present, and says explicitly: "the apparent present has duration," and moreover: the actually perceived present is not a knife cut but a saddle back with a certain width. Indeed, there are also passages which are suggestive of the overlap model, which no doubt explains why proponents of the latter such as Foster ( 1979 ) approvingly cite this Jamesian formulation: "Objects fade out of consciousness slowly. 13 It is easy to read his talk of "duration-blocks" as betraying a commitment to the Extensional cause.…”

Section: The Orthogonal and Extensional William Jamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Perception of Time

Dainton¹

2013

A Companion to the Philosophy of Time

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Aristotle long ago posed a puzzling question about time. Does it belong to the class of things which exist, or to the class of things which do not exist? In Book IV (chapter 9 ) of the Physics he supplies us with reasons for thinking it belongs to the realm of the non-existent. After all, "one part of it has been and is not, while the other is going to be, but is not yet . . . One would naturally suppose that what is made up of things which do not exist could have no share of reality." In addition to the past and future there is, of course, the present. But if, as it can seem natural to suppose, this is no more than the durationless boundary (or limit) separating the past and future, then even if we hold the present to be among the things which exist, we have not succeeded in gaining much by way of reality for time per se .This puzzle is deep, and philosophical opinion remains divided as to how best to respond to it, with some holding that reality is confi ned to the present, others holding that the past and/or the future also belong to the realm of the real. Rather less momentously, Aristotle ' s puzzle also arises in connection with our experience of temporality. Aristotle suggested that there is an intimate relationship between time and our awareness of change. Irrespective of whether he is right about that, he was surely right in thinking that change is something which fi gures in our ordinary experience. On listening to the regular beat of a drum (or the slow throb of a heart-beat, or the pulse of light on a sleeping computer), most of us can tell if the frequency increases, decreases, or remains unchanged. In so doing, we are displaying an ability to compare the temporal intervals between perceivable events, and estimate their magnitudes. But although this ability is a useful one, and much studied by psychologists interested in "time perception," we are able to apprehend change in a more vivid and direct manner. 1 When we look through the window of a speeding train, we see the countryside fl owing smoothly by. Holding one ' s hand under a running tap produces a tactile analogue: the fl owing 23 A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, First Edition. Edited by Heather Dyke and Adrian Bardon.

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“…It seems to most of us that we lose consciousness completely at least once every twenty four hours, when we slide off into dreamless sleep. If this is right, then a typical person can The simplest way of accommodating full connectedness is to permit neighbouring specious presents to overlap by sharing common parts, in the manner advocated Russell (1984) and Foster (1979). See Dainton (2000Dainton ( , 2003 for more detailed treatments of these topics.…”

Section: Consciousness and Self: A Parting Of Waysmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Self and the Phenomenal

Dainton

2004

Ratio

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As is widely appreciated and easily demonstrated, the notion that we are essentially experiential (or conscious) beings has a good deal of appeal; what is less obvious, and more controversial, is whether it is possible to devise a viable account of the self along such lines within the confines of a broadly naturalistic metaphysical framework. There are many avenues to explore, but here I confine myself to outlining the case for one particular approach. I suggest that we should think of ourselves (or our essential cores) as being composed of experience-producing systems, and that such systems belong to the same self when they have the capacity to contribute to unified streams of consciousness. The viability of this proposal rests in turn on a particular conception of the structure of consciousness, both at and over time; this conception is defended in the first part of the paper

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In Self-Defence

Cited by 18 publications

References 3 publications

'A Succession of Feelings, in and of Itself, is Not a Feeling of Succession'

'A Succession of Feelings, in and of Itself, is Not a Feeling of Succession'

The Perception of Time

The Self and the Phenomenal

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