The Perception of Time

Abstract

Aristotle long ago posed a puzzling question about time. Does it belong to the class of things which exist, or to the class of things which do not exist? In Book IV (chapter 9 ) of the Physics he supplies us with reasons for thinking it belongs to the realm of the non-existent. After all, "one part of it has been and is not, while the other is going to be, but is not yet . . . One would naturally suppose that what is made up of things which do not exist could have no share of reality." In addition to the past and future there is, of course, the present. But if, as it can seem natural to suppose, this is no more than the durationless boundary (or limit) separating the past and future, then even if we hold the present to be among the things which exist, we have not succeeded in gaining much by way of reality for time per se .This puzzle is deep, and philosophical opinion remains divided as to how best to respond to it, with some holding that reality is confi ned to the present, others holding that the past and/or the future also belong to the realm of the real. Rather less momentously, Aristotle ' s puzzle also arises in connection with our experience of temporality. Aristotle suggested that there is an intimate relationship between time and our awareness of change. Irrespective of whether he is right about that, he was surely right in thinking that change is something which fi gures in our ordinary experience. On listening to the regular beat of a drum (or the slow throb of a heart-beat, or the pulse of light on a sleeping computer), most of us can tell if the frequency increases, decreases, or remains unchanged. In so doing, we are displaying an ability to compare the temporal intervals between perceivable events, and estimate their magnitudes. But although this ability is a useful one, and much studied by psychologists interested in "time perception," we are able to apprehend change in a more vivid and direct manner. 1 When we look through the window of a speeding train, we see the countryside fl owing smoothly by. Holding one ' s hand under a running tap produces a tactile analogue: the fl owing 23 A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, First Edition. Edited by Heather Dyke and Adrian Bardon.

The Problem of Time's Passage

“…8 Infact,Kantarguesthings-in-themselvescannotbeinspaceandtime (seeKant,1998,pp534-535).This mayseemproblematic.Ifwecannotknowthings-in-themselves,howcanweknowthattheycannotbe spatiotemporal.ForadiscussionofhowKantcanconsistentlymaintainthatwecannotknowthings-inthemselves,butwecanknowthattheycannotbeinspaceandtimesee: Hogan,2010,pp.21-40. 9 Thoughthismaysoundlikedualism, Dainton(2012)doesnotcommithimselftodualism.Hebelieves thatsomematerialistpicturescantakeexperienceseriouslyintherelevantsense.Hewrites,If some form of dualism is true-whether substance dualism or property dualism-then since experience is non-physical, so too is P-motion. In this case, P-motion will be a part of our wider universe, i.e., the sum total of what exists, both material and immaterial, but it won't be part of the physical universe.…”

“…To understand why, it is helpful to again turn to the history of philosophy.ThoughhenevermentionsImmanuelKantbyname,DaintonusesaKantianstrategy whenexplainingtheperceptionsassociatedwithmovementandpassage.HeinvokesKantianthought whendistinguishingbetweenwhathecallsphenomenalmotionorP-motionandnon-phenomenal motionorNP-motion.P-motionreferstomotion"asitfeaturesinourimmediateexperience"while NP-motionreferstomotioninitspurelyphysicalform. Dainton(2012)describesNP-motionas"a featureofobjects-as-they-are-in-themselves"(p.129).Toreturnto"colorphi"example,phenomenal motionwouldrefertheanimatedcharacterofthedot'smovementandpigment(i.e.,dynamicmotion), whilenon-phenomenalmotionwouldrefertotheactualpositionandcolorofthedotateachpoint intime(i.e.,staticmotion).…”

“…9 Sowhenhe discussestheillusionofdynamicmotion,Dainton'suseoftheterm"illusion"isclear.Thephenomenal experienceofmotionisillusoryonlyinthesensethattheexperienceofitdoesnotappeartomatch thephysicaldescriptionofit.ButDaintonarguesthatdynamicmotionisarealfeatureofhuman experienceevenifthereisevidencethatthephysicaldescriptionofmotionmustdiffer.Inotherwords, ifoneassumesthattheonlyrealthingintheequationistheexternalobjectwhichcanbedescribed mathematically,thentheappearanceofthatthinginconsciousnessasflowingordynamicisdeceptive andincorrect-theexperienceshouldbeotherwise.However,iftheexperienceisalsofullyrealand irreducible,thentheexperienceisnotfalse.Itisdifferent,butjustasreal. Dainton(2012)holdsthat oneoughttotakeexperienceandconsciousnessseriously,suchthatexperienceis"justasrealasany featureofconcretereality"(p.129).…”

“…When one experiencesasingledot,whichismovingandchangingcolors,Paulclaimsone'sbrainissupposedly "fillingin"thenecessarypiecesofinformationsuchthatoneexperiencesstaticimagesashaving floworanimation.Shebelievesthatthiscasecanbeusedtoexplaintheapparentfloworpassageof time.Shewrites,"ifthebraincancreatetheillusionofflowincasesofapparentmotion,thenitcan createtheillusionofflowincasesofexperiencesasofpassage" (Paul,2010,p.353). Dainton(2012) Hethenarguesthatitispossiblethat"motionasitisinitself-motionasanunobservedpurely physicalphenomenon-doesnotinvolveanythingresemblingthesesensibleappearances:itconsists ofnothingmore(orless)thananobjectbeinglocatedatadifferentlocationatdifferentinstants" (Dainton,2012,p.127).But,heclaimsthatthisisnothowmotionappearstous,so"ourperceptual systems are responsible for creating the dynamic qualities that we perceive moving objects as possessing" (Dainton,2012,p.127).…”

Reviving the naïve realist approach to memory

“…The current instance of remembering does indeed (in some sense) co-exist or co-occur with past-perceived events-it is just that they are located in different temporal moments. Eternalism is by no means an uncontroversial view, but it has played a substantial role in how philosophers conceive of the nature of time, with various authors having defended it or given it serious consideration (Bardon, 2013;Callender, 2017;Dainton, 2013). Moreover, it has been argued recently that even naïve realism about perception requires commitment to eternalism (Moran, 2019).…”