In-Game Action

Sageng, John Richard

doi:10.1007/978-94-007-4249-9_15

Cited by 8 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 5 publications

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“…Before we try and find ways to usefully describe fictional actions, we might ask ourselves: if fictional actions are so hard to describe, why do we want to talk about them at all? Although some theorists argue that videogame actions are best explained as the real actions of manipulating graphical objects via a controller (Sageng 2012;Juul 2005;Matsunaga 2016), I would argue we need fictional actions if we want to explain the gamer's experience. For example, when gamers shoot a zombie in a videogame, they do so because they want to kill the monster.…”

Section: Troublesome Fictional Actionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fictionally Flipping Tetrominoes? Defining the Fictionality of a Videogame Player’s Actions

Mosselaer

2018

JPG

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In this paper, I use the case of player actions in Tetris to explore possible problems in existing descriptions of videogame actions as fictional actions. Both in the philosophy of computer games and videogame studies, authors often make use of Kendall Walton’s make-believe theory to describe videogame actions as fictional. According to the Waltonian description of fictional actions, however, the actions players perform when playing Tetris, such as flipping tetrominoes, would also be fictional. This is a counterintuitive idea, as players of Tetris seem to be really manipulating the graphical shapes in this game. I will thus discuss two other possible descriptions of fictional actions hinted at by Grant Tavinor (2009). Firstly, the (non-)fictional status of videogame actions might depend on the nature of the affordances to which they are reactions. Secondly, it might be the case that the player must take on a role in the fictional world for her action to be fictional. In the end, I will combine this second idea with a Waltonian description of fictional actions to form a new description of fictional actions that corresponds to and explains videogame players’ experiences.

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Section: Troublesome Fictional Actionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fictionally Flipping Tetrominoes? Defining the Fictionality of a Videogame Player’s Actions

Mosselaer

2018

JPG

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Breaking the Fourth Wall in Videogames

Mosselaer

2022

Being and Value in Technology

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Emotions, Actions and Inclinations to Act

Werner

2020

Erkenn

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Emotional responses to fiction are part of our experience with art and media. Some of these responses (“fictional emotions”) seem to be directed towards fictional entities—entities that we believe do not exist. Some philosophers argue that fictional emotions differ in nature from other emotional responses. (cf. Walton in J Philos 75(1):5–27, 1978, Mimesis as make-believe, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990, Walton, in: Hjort, Laver (ed.) Emotion and the arts, Oxford University, New York, 1997; Currie in The nature of fiction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990; Stecker in Br J Aesthet 51(3):295–308, 2011) The claim is supposed to be supported among others by ‘the argument from action.’ In contrast to genuine emotions, proponents of this argument claim, fictional emotions do not motivate their bearers to act. (cf. Yanal in Paradoxes of emotion and fiction, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, 1999; Lamarque in Br J Aesthet 21(4):291–304, 1981; Carroll in The philosophy of horror: or, paradoxes of the heart, Routledge, London, 1990; Currie 1990; Walton 1978, 1990; Suits in Pac Philos Q 87(3):369–386, 2006; Friend, in: Kind (ed.) The Routledge handbook of philosophy of imagination, Routledge, New York, 2016) This claim grounds in what may appear to be an obvious fact: that viewers and readers of are not led to act by their fictional emotions. It is certainly true that viewers and readers of fiction do not form intentions to perform actions directed towards fictional entities. In contrast to the proponents of the argument from action, I will argue that the lack of any such intentions can be explained only with reference to intending’s doxastic conditions, conditions that are unsatisfied in the fictional scenario. Decisively, this explanation does not refer to the motivational force of the agent’s emotions; indeed, it doesn’t refer to emotions at all. Thus, the lack of intentions to perform actions directed towards fictional objects provides no support for the claim that fictional emotions are no genuine emotions.

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In-Game Action

Cited by 8 publications

References 5 publications

Fictionally Flipping Tetrominoes? Defining the Fictionality of a Videogame Player’s Actions

Fictionally Flipping Tetrominoes? Defining the Fictionality of a Videogame Player’s Actions

Breaking the Fourth Wall in Videogames

Emotions, Actions and Inclinations to Act

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