In Defense of Obstinacy

Branquinho, João

doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2003.00001.x

Cited by 3 publications

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References 20 publications

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“…Both and are inspired by Branquinho (), though Branquinho puts references to the past and future times into the utterances themselves. It is critical that 1911 and 2111 serve as the respective times of evaluation for and ; nothing turns on whether or not 1911 and 2111 also figure into the utterances and the propositions expressed.…”

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confidence: 99%

Names and Obstinate Rigidity

Murday¹

2013

The Southern J of Philosophy

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Names are rigid designators, but what kind of rigidity do they exhibit? Both "obstinately" and "persistently" rigid designators pick out O at every world at which they pick out anything at all. They differ in that obstinately rigid designators also pick out O at worlds at which O fails to exist; persistently rigid designators have no extension whatsoever at worlds at which O fails to exist. The question whether names are obstinate or persistent arises in two contexts: in arguments against rigidified descriptivism (on the grounds that names and rigidified descriptions exhibit different kinds of rigidity) and in considerations about what it means for an expression to be "directly referential." This paper contends that names are persistent, not obstinate. The position thus clarifies the relationship between Millian theories of names and rigid designation, in addition to undermining attempts to rehabilitate the modal argument against rigidified descriptivism.Names are rigid designators. While that thesis is no longer controversial, multiple debates about the meaning of names continue. There is first the skirmish between rigidified descriptivists and their Kripkean opponents. Secondly, antidescriptivists disagree amongst themselves about the meaning of names. In both of these debates, one sometimes hears the claim that names are obstinately rigid as opposed to being merely rigid. This paper argues that such a claim is erroneous; whether descriptivism is true or not, names (like rigid descriptions) are merely persistently rigid.The paper will proceed as follows: Section 1 defines 'obstinacy' and explains the relevance to Kripke's modal argument. Section 2 reviews David Kaplan's content/extension distinction, which is presupposed throughout the paper. Sections 3 and 4 address and rebut arguments alleging a direct connection between (a) obstinate rigidity and (b) direct reference and/or Millian theories of names. Finally, section 5 returns to the debate between rigidified Brendan Murday is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religion at Ithaca College. His primary research interests are in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of language, particularly two-dimensional semantics and the problem of the criterion.

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Names and Obstinate Rigidity

Murday¹

2013

The Southern J of Philosophy

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“…), Language, Truth, and Logic. Oxford University Press; Murday (2013) 87 Murday(2013), p240 88 Plumer (1989), p7 and p10 89 Branquinho, João (2003). In defense of obstinacy.…”

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“…We see this concept inMcGinn (1982);Smith (1984;1987);Almog (1986);Stanley (1997) and;Branquinho, João (2003). In defense of obstinacy.…”

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Gappy Propositions and the Nature of Rigidity

Skrzynski¹

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<p>During the 1980s, there was much debate as to whether the potential rigidity of names allowed for such terms to refer to their objects in worlds where that object did not exist. Those who supported this idea supported an obstinate account of rigidity, and those who rejected the idea supported an account of persistent rigidity. No clear conclusion was ever reached between the two sides. In this thesis, I will raise a novel argument in support of persistent rigidity using a modern theory about singular propositions known as the gappy proposition view. My conclusion is that such a view can help resolve the earlier debate about the nature of rigidity by showing how gappy propositions may be utilised to undermine the strongest arguments once raised by the obstinate rigidity theorists.</p>

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Moral philosophy as the foundation of normative media theory: The case of African Ubuntuism

Fourie

2007

Comm

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In the South African debate about the role of the media in the new (post-apartheid) South African society, the African moral philosophy ubuntuism is from time to time raised as a framework for African normative media theory. Up till now, the possibility of using ubuntuism as a normative framework can, however, not yet be described as a focused effort to develop a comprehensive theory on the basis of which media performance could be measured from ‘an African perspective’. Rather, the topic of ubuntuism as normative media theory should be seen in the context of the African Renaissance as part of an intellectual quest to rediscover and re-establish idealized values of traditional African culture(s) and communities and to apply it to contemporary phenomena such as the media. However, given South Africa's history of apartheid in which Christian nationalism was misused as a moral philosophy to mobilize a patriotic media in the service of volk and vaderland, it is not too early to ask critical questions about ubuntuism as a possible framework for normative media theory. Such questioning is the purpose of this article. Against the background of a postmodern and a postcolonial perspective on normative theory, questions related to the following are raised: the expediency of ubuntuism in the context of changed African cultural values, the distinctiveness of ubuntuism as an African moral philosophy, the vulnerability of moral philosophy to political misuse, ubuntuism in the context of the future of normative theory in a globalized world and changed media environment, and, the implications of ubuntuism for journalism practice. It is concluded that ubuntuism may pose a threat to freedom of expression. Given the nature of contemporary South African society and its media system, a postmodern emphasis on diversity and pluralism as the cornerstone of future normative theory is supported.

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In Defense of Obstinacy

Cited by 3 publications

References 20 publications

Names and Obstinate Rigidity

Names and Obstinate Rigidity

Gappy Propositions and the Nature of Rigidity

Moral philosophy as the foundation of normative media theory: The case of African Ubuntuism

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