<p>During the 1980s, there was much debate as to whether the potential rigidity of names allowed for such terms to refer to their objects in worlds where that object did not exist. Those who supported this idea supported an obstinate account of rigidity, and those who rejected the idea supported an account of persistent rigidity. No clear conclusion was ever reached between the two sides. In this thesis, I will raise a novel argument in support of persistent rigidity using a modern theory about singular propositions known as the gappy proposition view. My conclusion is that such a view can help resolve the earlier debate about the nature of rigidity by showing how gappy propositions may be utilised to undermine the strongest arguments once raised by the obstinate rigidity theorists.</p>
<p>In this thesis, I analyse the meta-philosophical dialectic of philosophical progress: a discourse and debate concerned with whether and how the field of philosophy can be justifiably described as making progress or not. The conclusion I defend is an optimistic one; I argue that we can have a reasonable level of confidence that many philosophical investigations are progressing in a reasonably satisfactory manner. More than defending an optimistic position, I defend an optimism along tradition-preserving lines as well. My assertion is not just that philosophy can be defended as making progress (in general), but also that it can be defended as making progress as a field of investigative inquiry, akin to the sciences (rather than only as a ‘pragmatic’ or ‘view refining’ discipline, for example). Aside from defending my own view, I also map out, analyse, and critique the most prominent arguments for optimism that appear in the contemporary philosophical progress literature, in order to afford the opportunity for future arguments around philosophical progress to take place with more conceptual clarity and precision. Ultimately, I forward an original optimistic argument for progress based on an adapted truthlikeness model, modified to fit the context of philosophy.</p>
<p>During the 1980s, there was much debate as to whether the potential rigidity of names allowed for such terms to refer to their objects in worlds where that object did not exist. Those who supported this idea supported an obstinate account of rigidity, and those who rejected the idea supported an account of persistent rigidity. No clear conclusion was ever reached between the two sides. In this thesis, I will raise a novel argument in support of persistent rigidity using a modern theory about singular propositions known as the gappy proposition view. My conclusion is that such a view can help resolve the earlier debate about the nature of rigidity by showing how gappy propositions may be utilised to undermine the strongest arguments once raised by the obstinate rigidity theorists.</p>
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