In defence of good simpliciter

Abstract

Many including Judith Jarvis Thomson, Philippa Foot, Peter Geach, Richard Kraut, and Paul Ziff have argued for good simpliciter skepticism. According to good simpliciter skepticism, we should hold that there is no concept of being good simpliciter or that there is no property of being good simpliciter. I first show that prima facie we should not accept either form of good simpliciter skepticism. I then show that all of the arguments that good simpliciter skeptics have proposed for their view fail to show that we have good reason to accept good simpliciter skepticism. So, I show that we do not have good reason to accept good simpliciter skepticism.

Simply Good: A Defence of the Principia

“…If nothing else, this would be dialectically important: if we can show that the Moorean project could succeed, even if intrinsic value is non-relational, then we may gain a stronger reply to those who reject the Moorean system on such grounds. 35 There are, of course, other concerns about the notion of absolute goodness-for summary and discussion, see Klocksiem (2011) and Rowland (2016). However, the Thomson/Geach objection is, I believe, the most powerful and influential; it will therefore be my primary concern in what follows.…”

The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way

“…11 Compare this to the analyses of value in a way offered by Rowland (2016aRowland ( : 13802016b: 202-209, 215-218). 12 There may be a temptation to analyse personal value in terms of agent-relative reasons for responses.…”

“…All of this would be compatible with the view defended here 6 Among the philosophers to defend pluralism about value types from the objection ofGeach are Hare (1957: 107-108),Pigden (1990: 131-132),Zimmerman (2001: 20-25),Sinnott-Armstrong (2003),Arneson (2010),Sturgeon (2010), Smith (2010),Kraut (2011: 179), Orsi (2015: 58-61), and Rowland (2016a, 2016b). 7 Recent attempts to analyse value in a way in terms of fitting responses have been made by several philosophers, includingDarwall (2002),Rønnow-Rasmussen (2007,Skorupski (2010), Orsi (2015), andRowland (2016aRowland ( , 2016b.…”

Might anything be plain good?

“…The problem itself (or, at least, this common formulation of the problem) is incoherent if A&H are right and there is no such property as being plain good. 5 Rowland (2016) discusses various other arguments for goodness simpliciter scepticism. For instance, the argument that people do not use 'good' predicatively outside of the philosophy department.…”

“…One can hold that nothing is flat nor good, yet maintain that the respective concepts are nonetheless perfectly coherent. Rowland (2016) distinguishes between conceptual-and metaphysical goodness scepticism. Only the former is in play here.…”