Might anything be plain good?

Byrne, Thomas N.

doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0673-8

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 17 publications

(9 reference statements)

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“…But this cannot be the right way of understanding the genuinely/merely formally normative contrast regarding evaluative notions. 30 See Rowland (2016) and Byrne (2016); cf. Rowland (2019: 6-7).…”

Section: Genuine Normativity and Genuine Valuementioning

confidence: 99%

The Authoritative Normativity of Fitting Attitudes

Rowland¹

2022

Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 17

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Some standards, such as moral and prudential standards, provide genuinely or authoritatively normative reasons for action. Other standards, such as the norms of masculinity and the Mafia’s code of omertà, provide reasons but do not provide genuinely normative reasons for action. This chapter first explains that there is a similar distinction amongst attitudinal standards: some attitudes (belief, desire) have standards that seem to give rise to genuine normativity; others (boredom, envy) do not. This chapter gives a value-based account of which attitudinal standards give rise to genuine normativity. It argues that this account has interesting implications before extending it to provide an account of which action-guiding standards are genuinely normative. It argues that this value-based account of which standards are genuinely normative is more plausible than alternatives suggested in the literature and has interesting implications for genuine normativity in law and aesthetics.

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Section: Genuine Normativity and Genuine Valuementioning

confidence: 99%

The Authoritative Normativity of Fitting Attitudes

Rowland¹

2022

Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 17

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“…If this objection succeeds, it shows against all forms of consequentialism, not just epistemic consequentialism. Recently though, Byrne () has argued that Geach's and Thomson's arguments (and recent more sophisticated versions of that kind of argument) are unsound. What Byrne points out is that for some gradable adjectives like ‘flat,’ the adjective will fail Geach's and Thompson's test for a predicative adjective (as well as recent sophisticated reformulations of it) but still have a predicative reading.…”

Section: Littlejohn's Promotion‐based Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Geach's and Thomson's arguments depend on the semantic claim that ‘good’ only acts like an attributive adjective, never a predicative adjective, in our talk and thought. Borrowing an example from Byrne (), ‘acidic’ is a paradigmatic predicative adjective, since things can be just plain acidic, like lemon juice. On the other hand, ‘big’ looks like a purely attributive adjective, since nothing can be just plain big; things could be big lemons, big cars, big horses, or big buildings, but they can't just be big simpliciter .…”

Section: Littlejohn's Promotion‐based Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Demoting promoting objections to epistemic consequentialism

Singer

2019

Philosophical Issues

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“…9 Heim and Kratzer (1998, 71, entries (13), (14)) appears to be making more or less the same point. See Byrne (2016) for the most recent discussion of gradable adjectives and the distinction between predicative and attributive adjectives, and (Ib., §3.1) specifically for Geach's example above.…”

Section: The General Rule Of Left Subsectivitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Left Subsectivity: How to Infer that a Round Peg is Round

Jespersen

2016

Dialectica

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A property modifier is a function that takes a property to a property. For instance, the modifier short takes the property being a Dutchman to the property being a short Dutchman. Assume that being a round peg is a property obtained by means of modification, round being the modifier and being a peg the input property. Then how are we to infer that a round peg is a peg? By means of a rule of right subsectivity. How are we to infer that a round peg is round? By means of a rule of left subsectivity. This paper puts forward two rules (one general, the other special) of left subsectivity. The rules fill a gap in the prevalent theory of property modification. The paper also explains why the rules are philosophically relevant.

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Might anything be plain good?

Cited by 5 publications

References 17 publications

The Authoritative Normativity of Fitting Attitudes

The Authoritative Normativity of Fitting Attitudes

Demoting promoting objections to epistemic consequentialism

Left Subsectivity: How to Infer that a Round Peg is Round

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