In defence of error theory

Abstract

Many contemporary philosophers rate error theories poorly. We identify the arguments these philosophers invoke, and expose their deficiencies. We thereby show that the prospects for error theory have been systematically underestimated. By undermining general arguments against all error theories, we leave it open whether any more particular arguments against particular error theories are more successful. The merits of error theories need to be settled on a case-by-case basis: there is no good general argument against error theories.

In Defence of Radical Restrictionism

“…It might be argued that the general claim that some things are true, or the specific claim that it is true that I have hands, are so plausible that they must be retained no matter what philosophical argument against them is provided. In reply to such arguments, Daly and Liggins (: 225–6) argue that it has never been shown that common‐sense beliefs have this special epistemic status. Rinard () extends this reply.…”

In Defence of Existence Questions

“…Fine echoes this idea when he claims 3 See also Liggins 2006 andandLiggins 2010: 70-5. 4 For a critical survey of philosophical arguments against ordinary beliefs, see Daly and Liggins 2010. that the question of whether there are numbers is 'a mathematical question … that is to be settled on the basis of purely mathematical considerations', and says that scientists have the job of settling whether there are atoms (2009: 169).…”

Philosophical Renegades

“…Mark Johnston 1992a, 1992b, 1993Paul Horwich 1998 ;Frank Jackson 1998 ;Crispin Wright 1994 ;Thomas Kelly 2008 ; for rebuttals to these arguments see Alex Miller 2002 andChris Daly andDavid Liggins 2010). Those philosophical arguments supply me with good evidence E 3 that the evidence E 1 (based on expert endorsement) for the evidence E 2 (based on philosophical arguments) for the error theory is misleading.…”