Improving smart card security using self-timed circuits

Moore, Simon W.; Anderson, Ross; Cunningham, P.; Mullins, Robert; Taylor, G. L.

doi:10.1109/async.2002.1000311

Cited by 111 publications

(83 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…I agree that there is a serious problem with smartcards, but we've got a project going on that, we believe it to be fixable. We discuss this in a paper at a VLSI conference recently [9]. What we're proposing to do is to use self-timed dual-rail logic, so that the current that is consumed by doing a computation is independent of the data that is being operated on.…”

Section: Verifying Crypto Transaction Setsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Correctness of Crypto Transaction Sets

Anderson

2001

Security Protocols

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This talk follows on more from the talks by Larry Paulson and Giampaolo Bella that we had earlier. The problem I'm going to discuss is, what's the next problem to tackle once we've done crypto protocols? We keep on saying that crypto-protocols appear to be "done" and then some new application comes along to give us more targets to work on -multi-media, escrow, you name it. But sooner or later, it seems reasonable to assume, crypto will be done. What's the next thing to do?The argument I'm going to make is that we now have to start looking at the interface between crypto and tamper-resistance.Why do people use tamper resistance? I'm more or less (although not quite) excluding the implementation of tamper resistance that simply has a server sitting in a vault. Although that's functionally equivalent to many more portable kinds of tamper resistance, and although it's the traditional kind of tamper resistance in banking, it's got some extra syntax which becomes most clear when we consider the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIP) Bill. When people armed with decryption notices are going to be able to descend on your staff, grab keys, and forbid your staff from telling you, then having these staff working in a Tempest vault doesn't give the necessary protection.

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Section: Verifying Crypto Transaction Setsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Correctness of Crypto Transaction Sets

Anderson

2001

Security Protocols

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“…The existing counter-measures can be classified as technological counter-measures (such as metal shield), redundancy-based counter-measures for error detection (e.g. [22][23][24]), detector-based counter-measures which focus on fault detection (e.g. [25,26]).…”

Section: Counter-measuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Laser-Induced Fault Effects in Security-Dedicated Circuits

Beroulle

Candelier

Castro

et al. 2015

VLSI-SoC: Internet of Things Foundations

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Abstract. Lasers have become one of the most efficient means to attack secure integrated systems. Actual faults or errors induced in the system depend on many parameters, including the circuit technology and the laser characteristics. Understanding the physical effects is mandatory to correctly evaluate during the design flow the potential consequences of a laser-based attack and implement efficient counter-measures. This paper presents results obtained within the LIESSE project, aiming at defining a comprehensive approach for designers. Outcomes include the definition of fault/error models at several levels of abstraction, specific CAD tools using these models and new counter-measures well-suited to thwart laser-based attacks. Actual measures on components manufactured in the new 28 nm FDSOI technology are also presented.

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“…The countermeasures are also viable through hardware, by adding random delay or exploit balanced logic styles [12,13] etc. The effectiveness of these countermeasures varies with realistic implementations.…”

Section: Power Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluation Metrics of Physical Non-invasive Security

et al. 2010

Information Security Theory and Practices. Security and Privacy of Pervasive Systems and Smart Devices

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Improving smart card security using self-timed circuits

Abstract: We demonstrate how 1-of-n

Cited by 111 publications

References 4 publications

The Correctness of Crypto Transaction Sets

The Correctness of Crypto Transaction Sets

Laser-Induced Fault Effects in Security-Dedicated Circuits

Evaluation Metrics of Physical Non-invasive Security

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