2011
DOI: 10.1002/hfm.20264
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Implicit social cognition and safety culture

Abstract: Most models define safety culture as basic assumptions, attitudes, or values concerning organizational safety issues. When measuring safety cultures, many researchers have had their main focus on explicit safety‐critical attitudes and generally relied on specific survey instruments. It is questionable, however, whether self‐report measures can capture all aspects of organizational safety culture. Instead of getting direct answers, implicit measures rely on activating automatic attitudes derived from long‐term … Show more

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Cited by 28 publications
(45 citation statements)
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“…Since safety is a sensitive issue in a safety-priority organization, when asked directly, employees may be more likely to report the importance of safety [22], [23]. In indirect measures, participants have no control of the measurement outcome [43]; thus, response biases can be avoided to some extent [30].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since safety is a sensitive issue in a safety-priority organization, when asked directly, employees may be more likely to report the importance of safety [22], [23]. In indirect measures, participants have no control of the measurement outcome [43]; thus, response biases can be avoided to some extent [30].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As can be seen in Table , the SAPT scale, which represents an overall indicator of the workers’ task specific SA about error causation, correlates significantly with individual dimensions such as lack of knowledge ( r = 0.52, p < 0.001), lack of awareness ( r = 0.54, p < 0.001) complacency ( r = 0.56, p < 0.001), and lack of communication ( r = 0.41, p < 0.001), whereas none of the other dimensions revealed significant correlations. The four significant correlations can be estimated as moderate (Marquardt et al, ). All statistical tests were adjusted according to the Bonferroni correction for multiple significance testing ( α′ = α/13 = 0.003).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Because of the general character of the “Dirty Dozen Error” categories, a transfer from aviation to other industry contexts was fairly easy. Most of these error categories also occur in many other industries such as medicine (Marquardt, Treffenstädt, Gerstmeyer, & Gades‐Buettrich, ), chemical industry, timber industry, or metal industry (Marquardt, Gades, & Robelski, ). Because the questionnaire has got a generic character, no readapting to this different kind of industry was required.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A better understanding of human factors has become imperative within aviation and several models and systems have been introduced and implemented in the continuous attempt to predict and reduce human error. In aviation maintenance, there are twelve factors identified as the principal preconditions or conditions, that contribute to human error, widely known as the Dupont's Dirty Dozen [17,18,[50][51][52][53]. These elements are dissimilar in nature and appear either on personal, group or organizational performance levels [54].…”
Section: Phasementioning
confidence: 99%