Implementing Equitable Water Allocation in Transboundary Catchments: The Case of River Nestos/Mesta

107

Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) is a relatively new approach in Bolivia. However, it is now generally accepted that this approach needs to be established in order to find sustainable solutions for development and is actively promoted by the Water Ministry, especially in environmentally fragile regions, such as the Lake Poopo basin. The Lake Poopo basin is one of the poorest regions in the Bolivian Altiplano. It is confronted with severe water scarcity during the dry season, leading to low water quality, a high water-poverty index and low values of the watershed sustainability index. Furthermore, salinization and environmental degradation of soil and water are forcing people to migrate to urban areas. These are some of the factors underlying an ever-increasing complexity in integrated water resources management in the region. This paper proposes and develops a Multi-criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) in the Lake Poopo basin, based on economic, social and environmental criteria in an uncertain decision environment in order to support stakeholders in managing their water resources. Saaty's analytical hierarchy process (AHP) theory is applied here to solve the MCDA and to identify the alternatives using the highest expected utility value. The paper identifies the best solutions for existing conflicts, while promoting interaction with stakeholders and instruments in order to reach a sustainable strategy for water resources management in this water-scarce region.A. Calizaya et al.

Section: Iwrm In the Lake Poopo Basinmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) for Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) in the Lake Poopo Basin, Bolivia

Calizaya

Meixner

Bengtsson

et al. 2010

107

“…In different studies, one of which is over the Great Lakes, Becker and Easter (1999) use a non-cooperative game theory concept to analyze water diversions, and Eleftheriadou and Mylopoulos (2008) apply simulation and game theory concepts in the allocation of water resources over the Nestos/Mesta river, which is shared by Greece and Bulgaria. Different from Eleftheriadou and Mylopoulos (2008), but on the same basin, Kampragou et al (2007) again studies on allocation issues but this time focus is on legal aspects of allocations. They state the limitations in setting specific tools or methods for achieving the goal of equitable and reasonable allocation of water resources as set forth by the international legislation.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 98%

A Game Theoretic Approach to Assess the Impacts of Major Investments on Transboundary Water Resources: The Case of the Euphrates and Tigris

Küçükmehmetoğlu

2009

There are varying and inconsistent claims among countries sharing the same river basins. While upstream countries are asserting that they regulate flows through built-up reservoirs (enabling flood prevention) and reduce seasonal flow variations (providing water during drought seasons), downstream countries criticize upstream countries for excessive withdrawals and declining annual flows. Behind the scene, almost every basin country unilaterally envisions of ambitious projects demanding extensive water withdrawals for their prospective development and growth. This study establishes a methodology to measure the rational economic and political impacts of extensive reservoir projects throughout a basin, using the case of the Euphrates and Tigris. This methodology uses both linear programming applications calculating country and coalition benefits, and game theory concepts (core and Shapley value) for evaluating the impacts of reservoirs. The Euphrates and Tigris River Basin Model (ETRBM) is extended by adding the time dimension. In conjunction with time, reservoir capacities are incorporated into the model as a new set of parameters enabling resources allocations over multiple periods. In a rational economic view, the existence of reservoirs, while providing certain advantages in allocating water overtime, provides varying geopolitical powers to upstream and downstream basin countries. As a result of model applications, it is observed that basin-wide coalitions may potentially eliminate construction of excessive reservoir capacities, and, therefore, unnecessary investment costs and evaporation losses. It is also observed that assuming the absence of downstream reservoirs, the upstream reservoirs provide significant, first, economic benefit to the all forms of coalitions with upstream country and associated parties and, second, power to the country having the reservoirs in any coalition scenario. However, again in a game theoretic perspective, the power of upstream countries looses some of its weight when downstream 3070 M. Kucukmehmetoglu reservoirs are incorporated. During drought years, the availability of reservoirs ensures extensive core solutions and encourages a grand coalition among all parties.

“…We believe that the concept of sharing the shortage will be applicable elsewhere in Canada, and there has already been associated dialogue relative to the Okanagan region of British Columbia, where fruit-crop irrigation is prevalent, water supplies are limited, and water demands are increasing (Cohen et al 2006). Internationally, a move towards cooperative water planning and allocation is being attempted in some European nations (Kampragou et al 2007;Opricovic 2009), and this may involve shared shortages. South Africa is regarded as an international leader in some aspects of water management, including the broader consideration of social and environmental values to complement economic and political constraints (Postel and Richter 2003;van der Zaag 2007).…”

Section: Conclusion and Recommendationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Relaxing the Principle of Prior Appropriation: Stored Water and Sharing the Shortage in Alberta, Canada

Rood

Vandersteen

2009

Prior appropriation (allocation), 'first-in-time is first-in-right', provides a dominant water policy in western North America and some other regions worldwide. Concerns with this chronological prioritization arose during the Canadian Oldman River Dam project, since anticipated water for environmental flows and an indigenous group would have been unreliable with junior licenses. It was considered that in Alberta prior allocation applies only to the natural flow and water captured in a reservoir during surplus is not later bound by license seniority. Consequently, the Oldman Dam operation ensures minimal environmental flows and thereafter, 'sharing the shortage' is applied, with licensees receiving partial allotments during shortages. A related test-case for adjacent rivers with publicly-funded reservoirs accompanied a water shortage in 2001. It was considered unacceptable to cut-off water to a food-processing plant, a town, and water co-operatives with recent licenses, and consequently irrigation districts and others agreed to share the shortage, with all receiving 60% allotments. Following success, water sharing was also approved for 2002 and 2007. The discretionary use of stored water and sharing the shortage represent 'equitable allocation', an alternative to prior appropriation, which may benefit other jurisdictions facing water shortages.