This article surveys a range of current views on the semantics of imperatives, presenting them as more or less conservative with respect to the Truth-Conditional Paradigm in semantics. It describes and critiques views at either extreme of this spectrum: accounts on which the meaning of an imperative is a modal truth-condition, as well as various accounts that attempt to explain imperative meaning without making use of truth-conditions. It briefly describes and encourages further work on a family of views lying somewhere in the middle. On such views, an imperative will semantically determine, without having as its meaning, a modal truth-condition, which figures centrally in accounting for various aspects of its meaning.(3) General: If the weather is good, attack at dawn! Meteorologist: The weather will be good. General: Ah, then attack at dawn! Conditional imperatives will presumably (given the arguments against wide-scope-ism in Section 3.1) receive conditionalized EPs (if p, I command q) as their LFs. Since conditionalized EPs are just another type of indicative conditional, they will go in for modus ponens.