Compliance and Command I—categorical Imperatives

Fine, Kit

doi:10.1017/s175502031700020x

Cited by 17 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…I hypothesize that these accounts can be translated into truth-maker bilateralism in a straightforward way. Regarding the other direction, truth-maker theory has been used to give accounts of imperatives [36,37], the is-ought gap [38], verisimilitude [39], and counterfactuals [40]. It is worth investigating how much of these accounts could be recovered within truth-maker bilateralism and translated into normative bilateralism.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Laws of Thought and the Laws of Truth as Two Sides of One Coin

Hlobil

2022

J Philos Logic

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Some think that logic concerns the "laws of truth"; others that logic concerns the "laws of thought." This paper presents a way to reconcile both views by building a bridge between truth-maker theory, à la Fine, and normative bilateralism, à la Restall and Ripley. The paper suggests a novel way of understanding consequence in truth-maker theory and shows that this allows us to identify a common structure shared by truth-maker theory and normative bilateralism. We can thus transfer ideas from normative bilateralism to truth-maker theory, such as non-transitive solutions to paradox, and vice versa, such as notions of factual equivalence and containment.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Laws of Thought and the Laws of Truth as Two Sides of One Coin

Hlobil

2022

J Philos Logic

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“…In a collaboration (Anglberger et al 2016), we employed an action-theoretic version of truthmaker semantics to account for explicit obligation and permission. A version of truthmaker semantics has also been applied to imperative logic (Fine 2015).…”

Section: Deontic Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hyperintensionality and Normativity

Faroldi

2019

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“…2 Yet, it has already proved to be beneficial for the philosophical analysis of metaphysical modalities such as necessity and possibility [7] as well as deontic modalities, i.e. obligation and permission [8,9]. This paper will significantly contribute to provide a viable alternative to possible worlds semantics also for the epistemic modalities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

A Truthmaker-based Epistemic Logic

Saitta

2024

J Philos Logic

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The aim of this work is to investigate the problem of Logical Omniscience in epistemic logic by means of truthmaker semantics. We will present a semantic framework based on $$\varvec{W}$$ W -models extended with a partial function, which selects the body of knowledge of the agents, namely the set of verifiers of the agent’s total knowledge. The semantic clause for knowledge follows the intuition that an agent knows some information $$\varvec{\phi }$$ ϕ , when the propositional content that $$\varvec{\phi }$$ ϕ is contained in her total knowledge. We will argue that this idea mirrors the philosophical conception of immanent closure by Yablo (2014), giving to our proposal a strong philosophical motivation. We will discuss the philosophical implications of the semantics and we will introduce its axiomatization.

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Compliance and Command I—categorical Imperatives

Abstract: I develop a semantics for imperatives within the truthmaker framework by taking the meaning of an imperative to be given by the actions that are in compliance with or in contravention to the imperative.

Cited by 17 publications

References 32 publications

The Laws of Thought and the Laws of Truth as Two Sides of One Coin

The Laws of Thought and the Laws of Truth as Two Sides of One Coin

Hyperintensionality and Normativity

A Truthmaker-based Epistemic Logic

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