Impact of Non-truthful Bidding on Transport Coalition Profits

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Impact of Non-truthful Bidding on Transport Coalition Profits Jonathan Jacob and Tobias BuerAbstract A coalition of freight carriers is considered which has to decide how to allocate a pool of transport requests among its members. The literature is aware of a number of solution approaches which usually assume truthful behavior of the freight carriers. However, the used negotiation protocols are mostly not proven to enforce truthful behavior. This paper gives some insights into the impact of non-truthful behavior via computational experiments. We solve the collaborative problem via a genetic algorithm (GA) which is operated by an auctioneer. The GA's individuals are allocations of requests to carriers. To calculate the fitness of an individual, the carriers bid on the allocations. Bidding below a carrier's true valuation could ceteris paribus increase its profits. However, understated valuations can influence the search process negatively, in particular when a favoured allocation is dismissed wrongly. It is shown via computational experiments that for six tested instances, bidding non-truthfully is individually, but not collectively, rational and results in a kind of prisoner's dilemma.

Shared resources in collaborative vehicle routing

“…However, since requests are traded iteratively, it cannot guarantee efficiency. Jacob and Buer (2018) studied the impact of non-truthful behavior in carrier coalitions. They show settings, where strategic bidding is individually rational, but leads to a kind of prisoner's dilemma.…”

Collaboration in Transport and Logistics Networks

“…Li et al (2015) formulated a single request exchange approach. Jacob and Buer (2018) investigated the effects of non-truthful bidding and showed that is individually rational but not collectively rational, resulting into a variant of the famous prisoner's dilemma. Gansterer and Hartl (2016) investigated several request evaluation strategies building on Berger and Bierwirth (2010).…”