To explain motives underlying intergenerational transfers within a family, economists put two theoretical hypotheses forward: altruism and exchange. Empirical tests performed until now do not favor any of these models. One reason to explain this inadequacy could lie in the spurious assumption of homogeneity of behaviors. Little consideration has been given, in the study of motives, to the possibility that one or the other model could be more appropriate to characterize the behavior of a particular group. And the assumption that a single transfer motivation would be universally true seems to be questionable.This paper seeks to thoroughly analyze the diversity of inter vivos transfers' motivations through the study of a theme that economists have so far ignored: pocket money. This is done by using a particularly rich data set about parental money pocket given to children. The Education survey, carried out in 1992 in France, offers two main advantages for this study. First, it provides information both on the level of financial gifts and on parents and children's characteristics, including both generations' level of income. Second, some specific questions straightforwardly give information about these transfers' motivations. Two kinds of payment are distinguished: those given regularly, and those given punctually to meet the child's needs, to pay for some household chores, or to reward good results at school.Three models explaining these transfers from parents to children are presented theoretically. The flows of money may be motivated by altruism, exchange, or an endogenous altruism linked to preferences shaping. These three hypotheses generate differentiated predictions, which allow to identify family motivations in France. The econometric analysis puts forward the heterogeneity of family choices. It underlines the shortcomings of an aggregate approach in which payments are studied for households taken together. In this case, the test of unitary difference in income-transfer derivatives rejects the altruistic model. At a disaggregated level, regular payments must be distinguished form irregular ones. The former fit in an intertemporal framework, the latter are nearer altruistic motivations. But among them, buying of children's services and school rewards also exist.